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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider three examples of American actions to cure WTO violations: 
In 1996, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body finds the American ban on 
imported shrimp caught without turtle-safe nets to be a violation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). From 1996 through 1998, the State 
Department cures the violation by engaging in extensive negotiations with the 
affected states and by revising agency regulations regarding the certification of 
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acceptable shrimping methods. 
In 2000, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body 
finds the American tax treatment of domestic exports to be a prohibited subsi-
dy. In 2004, Congress complies with this decision by repealing the relevant sec-
tions of the tax code. 
In 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body finds the American use of 
safeguard actions against imported steel to be a violation of the Safeguard 
Agreement. The President complies by withdrawing the safeguard through an 
executive order. 
In theorizing about international law, much of the focus has been on the 
“demand-side” of state compliance: how can foreign governments, internation-
al institutions, NGOs, or domestic interest groups pressure a specific govern-
ment to respect its treaty commitments? The national government is modeled as 
a single transmission belt, aggregating national and international demands and 
producing a policy outcome. As the examples above illustrate, however, com-
pliance often requires action from different parts of the domestic government. 
Although the United States—as a nation—is responsible for any of its vi-
olations of international law, who within the state needs to take action to cure a 
violation depends on the specific measure. Different political actors within the 
U.S. government can be the “suppliers” of compliance depending on what trade 
measures need to be altered. As a result, scholars’ focus on the demand-side 
view of compliance has neglected the influence of domestic institutions in the 
supply policy outcomes and obscured the effects of domestic governmental pol-
itics on patterns of compliance with international law. 
Our study is one of the first to illustrate how examining the supply-side is 
necessary to understanding states’ compliance behavior. Specifically, we ana-
lyze American compliance with legal challenges at the WTO. The WTO treaty 
agreements include a dispute settlement system that provides third party adju-
dication of trade law violations, and the WTO has the authority to approve re-
taliation if a respondent state fails to comply with an adverse judgment. The 
U.S. government’s supply of compliance for WTO disputes varies for different 
trade issues. For some issues, such as the application of safeguards, the Execu-
tive has nearly complete discretion in resolving the dispute. Other issues re-
quire executive agencies to amend federal regulations. Finally, other topics, 
such as agriculture subsidies or intellectual property law, demand legislative 
action. 
We hypothesize that which actor is required to respond to a WTO viola-
tion matters because government institutions are differently situated in terms of 
their decision-making procedures, their engagement in foreign affairs, and their 
constituencies. These factors make the executive branch more likely to comply 
(and comply quickly) than Congress. First, it is simply easier for the executive 
branch to act. Complying with an adverse WTO ruling requires an affirmative 
change of national policy. All else being equal, the executive branch can act 
faster than Congress because it has fewer procedural hurdles. Second, the exec-
utive branch has a greater interest than Congress in maintaining good interna-
tional relations on a day-to-day basis. The U.S. government’s refusal to comply 
with an international court’s decision may harm the executive branch’s effec-
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tiveness in foreign affairs—lowering the Executive’s perceived job perfor-
mance—but voters may view the same behavior by members of Congress posi-
tively. 
To test this theory, we examine how the U.S. government alters national 
policy in response to the cases initiated within the WTO dispute settlement pro-
cedure. To do so, we have compiled the first data set of the policy actions the 
U.S. has taken in response to other states’ requests for dispute settlement con-
sultations. After controlling for important characteristics of the state filing the 
request and the importance of the affected domestic industry, we are able to 
demonstrate that who within the government supplies compliance is the best 
predictor of whether and when the U.S. government complies with WTO rul-
ings. The need for congressional involvement in the compliance process both 
decreases the likelihood of compliance and delays compliance more than any 
other factor. 
This finding has important implications for international law and interna-
tional relations theory because it suggests that there may not be a unitary model 
to explain states’ responses to international law. Prior research in international 
law and international relations studying a state’s decision to comply with inter-
national law has largely modeled the state as a single, unitary actor. Instead, 
this work demonstrates that—at least in the context of U.S. compliance with 
adverse WTO decisions—the decision of whether to comply with international 
legal obligations varies depending on which domestic political actors are en-
gaged in the policy process. Some institutions are more likely to supply com-
pliance than others. In addition, the structure of the national government can 
have large, systematic effects on the country’s rate of compliance. As such, 
theoretical approaches that treat states as unitary actors, even when responding 
to international court judgments against the state, obscure important causal pro-
cesses that are critical to understanding compliance outcomes. 
The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses dispute resolution 
procedures at the WTO and previous scholarship that has studied compliance 
with WTO decisions. Part III examines U.S. compliance procedures before de-
veloping the hypothesis that the executive branch should be expected to comply 
with adverse WTO decisions more often and more quickly than Congress. Part 
IV describes the data we collected to test this hypothesis, and Part V presents 
our empirical results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of 
these results to WTO dispute resolutions specifically and compliance with in-
ternational law generally. 
II. COMPLIANCE WITH THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
Compliance is a major concern for the study of international law.1 In a 
 
 1. See generally Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
273 (2010) (surveying research on compliance with international law). In fact, the focus on compliance 
is so central to the study of international law that perhaps the most cited and analyzed quotation in the 
field is Louis Henkin’s claim that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 
(1979). But see Lisa Martin, Against Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SYNTHESIZING INSIGHTS FROM 
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system without central enforcement where states rely on self-help mechanisms, 
the states’ willingness to comply with international rules that go against their 
perceived self-interest (immediate or otherwise) is always in question.2 Conse-
quently, the field of international law is highly focused on the question of why 
states comply and how to increase compliance.3 This is not only true of inter-
national law generally, but international trade law specifically.4 This Part ex-
plains the WTO dispute resolution system, and then discusses existing scholar-
ship that has sought to explain what drives compliance with WTO decisions. 
A. Litigation at the WTO 
The WTO has one of the most well known systems of state-to-state adju-
dication.5 Member states have agreed to give the WTO dispute settlement sys-
 
INTERDISCIPLINARY SCHOLARSHIP 591-92 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., 2013) (arguing that 
although compliance is one of the primary topics of study by international relations scholars, the focus 
on it is misplaced). 
 2. See, e.g., George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1996) (arguing that evi-
dence of compliance with international law may be due to selection effects). For a brief overview of why 
compliance with international law does not always occur efficiently, see ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. 
SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-29 (2013). 
 3. For an overview of social science research focused on compliance with international law, 
see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on Interna-
tional Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 88-94 (2012). For examples of empirical 
scholarship examining compliance with international law, see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (investigating whether states comply with 
international human rights treaties); Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mecha-
nism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363, 364 (2005) (investigating how domestic politics drives compliance with inter-
national environmental agreements); Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J.C. Sharman, Using 
Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 657 (2013) (evaluat-
ing whether private firms offering business incorporation services comply with international law); Chris-
topher F. Gelpi & T. Camber Warren, When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Rela-
tive Partisan Shift on International Treaty Compliance, 63 INT’L ORG. 341 (2009) (evaluating how 
domestic political factors influence compliance with international agreements); Oona Hathaway, Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (studying compliance with in-
ternational human rights agreements); Daniel W. Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties 
on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010) (analyzing whether states comply with international human 
rights treaties); James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
559 (2007) (studying compliance with the laws of war); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State 
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 
(2000) (studying compliance with international monetary law); Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth & 
Sarah Croco, Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times 
of War, 58 WORLD POL. 339 (2006) (studying compliance with the laws of war); and Jana von Stein, Do 
Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 
(2005) (questioning previous research on compliance with international treaties). For a discussion of 
many of the difficulties of studying compliance using observational methods, see Adam Chilton & 
Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
176 (2013). 
 4. For a review of empirical scholarship on international trade law, see Gregory Shaffer & 
Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 30-35 
(2012). See also infra Section II.B. 
 5. For a short overview of the WTO dispute resolution process, see POSNER & SYKES, supra 
note 2, at 281-87. For a thorough treatment of WTO dispute settlement procedures, see DAVID 
PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (1997); and JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2002). 
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tem broad and mandatory jurisdiction over trade disputes. In addition, member 
states are expressly prohibited from undertaking countermeasures until the 
WTO determines that there is a breach of trade rules and sets the limits on the 
level of permissible retaliation. This Section first briefly discusses the devel-
opment of this adjudicative institution, including why the U.S. government 
pushed for the creation of rule-based dispute resolution. It then reviews the 
procedural rules governing WTO dispute resolution and the application of retal-
iatory measures. 
1. The Creation of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System 
Negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) was designed to address 
governments’ dissatisfaction with the GATT regime’s dispute resolution pro-
cess. The GATT formally included a dispute resolution system, but it func-
tioned on a consensus basis, which allowed respondent states to slow down the 
adjudication and block unfavorable rulings.6 Interestingly, the United States 
was one of the states that spearheaded the proposal for a stronger dispute reso-
lution system in international trade.7 The United States had long complained 
that the GATT dispute resolution procedures were flawed because they pre-
cluded the ability to threaten sanctions against states that breached trade rules.8 
Given the limits of GATT adjudication, the U.S. government developed a prac-
tice of unilaterally sanctioning states it judged to be in violation of trade rules.9 
This practice was very controversial with its trading partners, who argued that 
the United States was overly aggressive in its interpretation of trade law and the 
level of sanctions it applied.10 In particular, the European Community and the 
Japanese government demanded that the United States cease this practice. Nei-
ther the European governments nor the Japanese government were enthusiastic 
about creating a more “rule-based” dispute resolution system, as compared to 
the more “diplomacy-based” GATT system, but were willing to consider such 
an institution if it limited states’ ability to act unilaterally.11 
The WTO’s dispute settlement system emerged as a compromise between 
these positions. Fulfilling American demands, the new adjudicatory system 
 
 6. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 6-11. The GATT system of dispute resolu-
tion changed in significant ways between the GATT’s creation in 1947 and its effective end with the 
entry into force of the World Trade Organization in 1995. For an excellent review of the evolution of 
GATT adjudication and government compliance with panel rulings, see generally ROBERT HUDEC, 
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) (trac-
ing the development of GATT law). 
 7. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, 
AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 69 (2006); Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Reso-
lution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 251-52 (2006). 
 8. See BARTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 69; JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 149 (1995); Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institu-
tional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102, 108 (2011). 
 9. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE 
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA’S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1-2 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990). 
 10. See Brewster, supra note 8, at 108-09; CROOME, supra note 8, at 147-51. 
 11. See Brewster, supra note 8, at 108-09. 
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would be mandatory, operate on strict timelines, and be capable of authorizing 
retaliation in response to breaches of trade rules. The new system would also 
prohibit unilateral action, the condition imposed by the European and Japanese 
governments. WTO members would not be legally permitted to respond to a 
perceived violation of trade rules until the WTO system had finished its adjudi-
catory process and had authorized retaliation. 
As a matter of domestic politics, a stronger dispute resolution system for 
the global trade regime was a longstanding American priority. Congress had 
specifically instructed the president to seek “more effective and expeditious 
dispute settlement mechanisms” in the Uruguay Round negotiations in order to 
enforce U.S. trade rights.12 Nonetheless, members of Congress were not entire-
ly satisfied with the new WTO dispute resolution system when the Uruguay 
Round Agreements were submitted to the House and the Senate for ratification. 
Legislators recognized that the new adjudicatory mechanisms would bind them, 
as well as other states, to WTO interpretations of trade rules. As such, many 
legislators were concerned that trade rules would restrict American sovereign-
ty.13 Members of Congress ultimately accepted the dispute resolution mecha-
nism as part of the package of trade benefits and concessions that the new 
WTO treaty offered.14 
Agreeing to the dispute resolution system, however, did not make U.S. 
compliance with WTO adjudicatory decisions a foregone conclusion. The Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding itself does not demand that states comply with 
WTO adjudicative rulings. Compliance is the “preferred” option, but ultimately 
states can maintain their policies that breach the trade rules and simply accept 
retaliatory actions from injured states.15 Thus, U.S. policymakers recognized 
that non-compliance with WTO rulings would always be an option, although 
perhaps a costly one. Agreement to the WTO dispute resolution system restrict-
ed the government’s unilateral enforcement of trade rules, but did not require 
compliance with all adverse decisions. The decision of whether to change do-
mestic policy to abide by WTO rules remained a matter of domestic politics. 
 
 12. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 278-79. 
 13. Id. at 279. Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole offered legislation that would offer an “es-
cape” from adverse WTO rulings. The legislation called for the creation of a commission of federal 
judges who would evaluate whether the WTO system had exceeded its interpretative authority in any 
case the United States lost. If the panel found that the WTO system had overstepped its bounds, any leg-
islator could propose a resolution that the United States withdraw from the WTO Agreements. Senator 
Dole’s proposal ultimately did not gain legislative support, but the remedy—that members of Congress 
propose legislation demanding that the United States exit the WTO—is always a policy option regard-
less of whether WTO dispute resolution system exceeds its delegated authority. However, the U.S. gov-
ernment’s decision of whether to withdraw from the WTO will necessarily entail a broader analysis of 
the costs and benefits of membership as well as the likelihood that a threat of withdrawal could prompt 
desired reforms. For an analysis of the Dole legislation, see Gary N. Horlick, WTO Dispute Settlement 
and the Dole Commission, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 45, 46 (1995); and Gary R. Saxonhouse, Dispute Set-
tlement at the WTO and the Dole Commission: USTR Resources and Success, in ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
FOR U.S.-JAPAN TRADE POLICIES 363 (Robert M. Stern ed., 2002). 
 14. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 279-82 (discussing congressional approval of the WTO 
Agreements under “Fast-Track” voting rules). 
 15. Warren F. Sykes & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002). 
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2. The WTO’s Adjudicatory Procedures 
In the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the member states of the 
WTO created a quasi-judicial system that granted the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) compulsory jurisdiction over member states’ disputes.16 If one member 
alleges that another member is violating its WTO trade obligations, the injured 
member can bring its complaint to the DSB.17 If a member files a formal com-
plaint, the parties are required to engage in consultations to attempt to settle the 
dispute for at least sixty days.18 If consultations fail, the DSB begins the two 
stage adjudicative process. The parties can mutually agree to suspend or end 
the case at any point in the process.19 
The first stage includes a “trial” phase where a panel of ad hoc arbitrators, 
chosen by the parties, hears evidence from both parties and issues a ruling.20 
One or both of the parties can appeal the arbitrators’ decision on issues of law 
to the Appellate Body.21 If the panel decision is not appealed, then the DSB 
votes to adopt reports based on a “reverse consensus” rule.22 That is, unless 
there is a consensus in the DSB to reject the panel’s report, the report is adopt-
ed.23 As of this writing, the DSB has never failed to adopt a report using the 
 
 16. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401[hereinafter DSU]. The DSB consists of all of the member states of the WTO. See id. art. 
3(10). The DSB grants requests for a panel hearing and adopts the decision of the arbitrators or the Ap-
pellate Body by reverse consensus. Reverse consensus means that the panel is authorized and the report 
is adopted unless no state—including the state that is requesting the panel or has won the legal case—
supports the motion. See id. art. 17(14); see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 61 (“Under 
the WTO, the GATT consensus requirement is reversed: consensus in the WTO is required to reject, 
rather than to adopt, the report.”); WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 718 (“Appellate Body reports are to be 
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides 
by consensus against.”). 
 17. WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 132-33. Technically, there can be either a violation of the 
WTO agreements or a “nullification or impairment” of the complaining member’s benefits under the 
agreement. We use the term “violation” to refer to both for ease of exposition. The DSU gives the DSB 
compulsory jurisdiction for all disputes concerning the WTO Agreements included in Annex 1. See 
DSU, supra note 16, art. 1(1). There are some WTO Agreements over which the DSB does not have 
jurisdiction. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 19 (citing Report of the Panel, Canada–
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, ¶ 1.4, L/55D4 (July 25, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(30th Supp.) at 140, 141 (1984)). 
 18. DSU, supra note 16, art. 4(7). See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 66 (“[T]he 
complaining Member may not ask for a panel until 60 days have elapsed from the date of the original 
request, unless the parties agree that further consultations would not be productive.”). 
 19. DSU, supra note 16, art. 12(12). The panel may suspend its work at the request of the par-
ties for up to twelve months. If after twelve months the work of the panel is still suspended, the “authori-
ty for the establishment of the panel shall lapse.” Id. 
 20. See generally DSU, supra note 16, art. 8 (setting forth the terms of reference of a panel). 
The panels are normally comprised of three individuals. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 
68-69. The panelists are typically either former members of delegations to the WTO that were not from 
one of the countries to the present dispute or academics. Id. In certain conditions, the panel may consist 
of five members. Id. Additionally, a special provision has been included within the rules of the DSU so 
that when a developing country is a party to a dispute, it may request that at least one member of the 
panel be from a developing country. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 8(10). 
 21. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 17(6) (“An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in 
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”). 
 22. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 16(4) (noting that a report shall be adopted “unless a party to 
the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to 
adopt a report”). 
 23. WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 632. For more information on “reverse consensus” require-
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reverse consensus rule and DSB adoption of reports is generally considered to 
be a near “automatic” process.24 
If the panel decision is appealed, then the case is referred to the Appellate 
Body, a standing body of seven members, who hear appeals in groups of 
three.25 The Appellate Body hears appeals only on questions of law26 and will 
amend the reasoning of the panel if it finds that the panel erred in its interpreta-
tion of the WTO Agreements.27 The Appellate Body’s report is also adopted 
by the DSB on a reverse consensus basis.28 If the adopted report finds that the 
respondent state is in breach of its WTO obligations, the DSB will recommend 
that the respondent state bring its measures into compliance with the WTO 
Agreements within a reasonable period of time—typically twelve to fifteen 
months.29 
The adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report is often not the end of 
the litigation process for specific trade disputes. Members are increasingly en-
gaging in “compliance proceedings” after the initial adjudication.30 These pro-
ceedings address the question of whether the respondent state’s changes to the 
challenged policy are sufficient to cure the violation.31 If the complaining gov-
ernment believes that the violation has not been cured, then it can request a 
compliance panel (an Article 21(5) panel) to evaluate whether the respondent 
state’s actions sufficiently addressed the concern.32 Like the merits panel re-
port, either party can appeal the compliance panel report to the Appellate 
 
ment in the WTO, see sources cited supra note 16. 
 24. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein & Richard Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of the WTO 
Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 7 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 257, 266 (2008) (explaining that 
adoption of panel reports is almost assured because the prevailing party in the dispute would have to 
agree to block the ruling due to the reverse consensus rule, which is incredibly unlikely to happen). 
 25. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 17(1). A three-judge panel of Appellate Body members hears 
the appeal. The WTO Agreements have no provision for the Appellate Body to sit en banc. Appellate 
Body members serve for a four-year term that may be renewed by the membership once. For more in-
formation on the composition of the Appellate Body, see WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 706-07. 
 26. DSU, supra note 16, art. 17(6). See generally WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 697-98 (de-
scribing Appellate Body jurisdiction). 
 27. DSU, supra note 16, art. 17(13). For more information on the nature of an appeal in the 
DSU, see WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 703-05. See also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 
135-52 (describing confidentiality and burden of proof in DSU proceedings). For a critical evaluation of 
the DSU Appellate Body, see Petros C. Mavoidis, License to Adjudicate: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Work of the WTO Appellate Body So Far, in TRADE DISPUTE AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 73 (2009). 
 28. See Maroidis, supra note 27, at 73 (“An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the 
DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not 
to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members.”). 
 29. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 21(3) (determining what constitutes a “reasonable period” for 
implementation of a DSB report is a complicated issue under WTO). For a discussion of the issue, see 
WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 648-59. 
 30. See William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 119, 125 (2009) (explaining that compliance proceedings are frequently used as a tactic to 
delay implementation of DSB reports). 
 31. These proceedings are governed by DSU Article 21(5). For a discussion of compliance 
proceedings, see PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 293-95 (2013). 
 32. A compliance proceeding can be initiated by either party to the initial dispute. See Appel-
late Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 152, 
153(b), WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2011). 
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Body.33 The DSB adopts these reports on a reverse consensus basis.34 
The second stage of the litigation process is the remedy stage. If a re-
spondent state fails to cure violations of WTO rules within the reasonable peri-
od of time set out by the DSB, then the complaining state can request that the 
DSB authorize it to suspend trade concessions to the respondent state.35 The 
respondent state can request a panel to arbitrate the maximum extent and the 
possible forms of the suspension.36 The parties cannot appeal this ruling.37 
The DSB implements the panel’s ruling by authorizing the complaining gov-
ernment to suspend concessions up to the level determined by the panel.38 
The retaliation does not make the complaining party whole. The ability to 
suspend benefits is often economically costly to the state (i.e. raising tariff lev-
els can be expected to harm the economies of the complaining and the respond-
ent state although some political benefits may accrue).39 In addition, the reme-
dy offered by the WTO is only prospective.40 The retaliation authorized by the 
DSB (and determined by the panel) is based on the complaining state’s current 
level of injury from the respondent state’s policy, meaning the complaining 
state cannot retaliate for any loss of benefits from the violating policy that oc-
curred before the remedy panel’s hearing. This is true even if the respondent 
state maintained the policy well after the DSB’s reasonable period of time to 
comply with the rule expired. This system creates an incentive for respondent 
states to drag their feet and extend the litigation process for as long as possi-
ble.41 
The nature of litigation at the WTO creates two different measures re-
garding compliance with the WTO process. The first measure is whether the 
member state formally comes into compliance at all. This is the more straight-
 
 33. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 31, at 295. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., WAINCYMER, supra note 5, at 675-79 (analyzing Article 22 of the DSU). See 
generally DSU, supra note 16, art. 22 (discussing compensation and suspension of concessions). The 
authorization is specific to the complaining state (or states, if there is more than one complaining party). 
Third parties to the litigation (or other states that are injured by the respondent’s violation) are not per-
mitted to suspend trade benefits. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 169. 
 36. DSU, supra note 16, art. 22(3). Article 22(3) discusses when different forms of retaliation 
are permitted. Sectoral retaliation refers to the sectors in the GATS and TRIPS agreements (all goods are 
considered to be in the same sector under the GATT). “Across agreement retaliation” refers to complain-
ing state actions that withdraw benefits in agreement (GATT, GATS, or TRIPS) other than the one in 
which the violation existed. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 169-71. 
 37. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 22(7); see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 
171. 
 38. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 5, at 171-72. 
 39. See Adam S. Chilton & Ryan W. Davis, Equality, Procedural Justice, & the World Trade 
Organization, 7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 105, 145 (2012) (discussing how the economic 
costs of imposing retaliatory measures may make it undesirable for certain states—particularly develop-
ing countries—to impose retaliatory measures under the current rules of the DSU). 
 40. See Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127, 134 (2007) (arguing 
that the prospective nature of WTO remedies creates a “perverse [incentive] for violation” because of-
fending states are not required to compensate for losses before the expiration of the reasonable period of 
time). 
 41. See Davey, supra note 30, at 125 (“Prospective retaliation gives the losing country an in-
centive to delay the time of reckoning as long as possible and probably explains the extensive delays in 
the system . . . .”); see also Trachtman, supra note 40, at 134-35 (noting that the average period from the 
establishment of a panel to adoption of the final report exceeds three years). 
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forward inquiry of whether the state ultimately decides to alter the policy to 
conform to WTO legal obligations. The second measure is how long it takes the 
state to comply. Even if the state ultimately decides to amend its measure, how 
long the respondent state maintains the illegal policy after the adverse DSB de-
cision (the ruling on the merits) is important in determining the quality of the 
state’s compliance. Because the WTO system only permits a prospective reme-
dy at the end of the litigation process, the timing of compliance is particularly 
important in trade law. 
B. Research on Compliance with WTO Decisions 
In the last decade, there has been a growing body of literature trying to 
explain when and why states comply with adverse decisions from the WTO.42 
Perhaps the most developed articles within this scholarship examine whether 
the existence and the design of third-party dispute resolution institutions im-
prove compliance rates or otherwise enhance the effectiveness of the treaty re-
gime.43 For instance, Daniel Kono finds that the existence of a dispute resolu-
tion panel improves trade liberalization between states but that the form of the 
panel—whether it is more or less legally binding—does not matter.44 Marc 
Busch and Eric Reinhardt find that the institutional shift from GATT dispute 
resolution to WTO dispute resolution does not improve compliance rates for 
GATT issues and does not improve compliance in EU-U.S. disputes.45 Eric 
Posner and John Yoo argue that the design changes between the GATT and the 
WTO have decreased compliance rates because more independent adjudicators 
make decisions that are less acceptable to the disputing parties.46 By contrast, 
 
 42. See generally Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 34-35 (discussing the state of scholar-
ship on compliance with WTO law). For examples of studies examining compliance rates with WTO 
decisions generally, see ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); Chad Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 811 (2004); and Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Mem-
bers with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Data, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397 
(2007). 
 43. There is a rich literature on the question of whether to initiate a WTO dispute. See, e.g., 
CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE RULES IN THE WTO (2012); Christina L. 
Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/ WTO Adjudi-
cation, 71 J. POL. 1033 (2009); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Em-
pirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 
(2002); Thomas Sattler & Thomas Bernauer, Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation 
in the World Trade Organization, 50 EUR. J. POL. RES. 143 (2010). Although it is certainly possible—if 
not probable—that domestic political considerations influence the decision to initiate trade disputes, we 
do not address issues of initiation here. 
 44. Daniel Y. Kono, Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Coop-
eration, 69 J. POL. 746, 746 (2007). 
 45. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO 465, 465-66 
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003); see also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, The 
Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in TRADE POLICY RESEARCH 143, 143-45 (John M. Curtis 
& Dan Ciuriak eds., 2003) (attributing the success of the WTO in inducing favorable outcomes to the 
expanded scope of actionable cases and the propensity of wealthy complainants to win, rather than DSU 
reforms). Busch and Reinhardt find that the WTO dispute resolution system has an overall higher rate of 
compliance than the GATT dispute resolution system, but they argue that this is due to the inclusion of 
the TRIPS and GATS agreements (and the high levels of state compliance with DSB decisions on these 
agreements) in the WTO. Busch & Reinhardt, supra, at 143-45, 472-75. 
 46. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
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Bernhard Zangl argues that the GATT to the WTO shift has increased compli-
ance with rulings on EU-U.S. disputes and intra-OECD disputes.47 Scholars 
also argue that more legal dispute resolution institutions should increase com-
pliance by raising reputational costs on breaching states and lowering the repu-
tational costs of sanctioning for complaining states.48 
It is notable that all of the current approaches examine compliance ques-
tions at the state level. Intrastate variation in compliance levels is not measured 
even if there are theoretical reasons to expect that various governmental bodies 
would respond differently to international adjudicative decisions.49 In WTO-
specific and more general compliance studies, the greatest focus by far is on the 
demand side of compliance—that is, the pressures on the breaching state from 
foreign governments, NGOs, or domestic interest groups to conform its actions 
to be consistent with international law and how institutional design can maxim-
ize this pressure.50 The field of international law examines only to a much 
 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44-57, 66-67 (2005). 
 47. Bernhard Zangl, Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement Under 
GATT and the WTO, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 825, 825-27 (2008). 
 48. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 9, 33-48 (2008); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 53 INT’L ORG. 421, 427-31 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward 
a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Alexander Thompson, The 
Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctions Dilemma, 1 INT’L THEORY 307 
(2009). Most scholarship on how best to reform the WTO comes from legal scholars who focus on the 
remedies available under WTO rules. These recommendations are also pitched at the state level. For 
example, they include calls to increase the level of retaliation available for breach. See, e.g., Davey, su-
pra note 30, at 123. Alternatively, they include calls to introduce damages for both retrospective and 
prospective damages. See, e.g., Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in 
the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005); Chilton 
& Davis, supra note 39, at 321-22; Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies 41-44 (ICTSD, Re-
source Paper No. 5, 2003). They also include calls to allow for the collective application of retaliation. 
See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward a More 
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000). Other calls are to allow for tradable countermeas-
ures. See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell et al., The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 395 (Evenett & Hoekman eds., 
2006); Chilton & Davis, supra note 39, at 323-24; see also Special Session of the Council for Trade in 
Services, Proposal by Mexico, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002). But see Trachtman, supra note 40, at 155-56 (dis-
cussing the limitations of proposals to create actionable countermeasures). It is worth noting, however, 
that there are scholars who have advocated against reforming the remedies available under the DSU. 
See, e.g., Bryan Mercurio, Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 315 (2009); Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reform-
ing the WTO Enforcement Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2008). 
 49. See, e.g., Brewster, supra note 7, at 264-5 (arguing that the United States’ willingness to 
submit to binding arbitration by an international trade court is in part due to the President’s desire to 
gain the upper hand in negotiations with Congress); Judith Goldstein, International Law and Domestic 
Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws, 50 INT’L ORG. 541, 541 (1996) (argu-
ing that membership in international institutions is a strategy by which domestic political actors are able 
to further their own interests). 
 50. For examples of demand-side examinations of compliance with the WTO, see DAVIS, su-
pra note 43, at 244-56; Krzysztof J. Pelc, Eluding Efficiency: Why Do We Not See More Efficient 
Breach at the WTO?, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 629 (2010) (discussing the absence of efficient breach); 
and Tobias Hofmann & See Yeon Kim, The Political Economy of Compliance in WTO Disputes (2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://sykim.weebly.com/uploads/3/3/4/4/3344542/hofmann__ 
kim_2009_-_wto_compliance.pdf. For examples of studies of compliance that focus on the demand side, 
see XINYUAN DAI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL POLICIES (2007); Dai, supra note 3; 
and Simmons, supra note 3. 
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lesser extent the supply side of compliance—the internal state policy process of 
curing breaches of international law. The only work that currently incorporates 
domestic institutions are studies of the influence of domestic courts in enforc-
ing international or supranational judicial decisions.51 These studies actively 
discuss domestic institutions, but decision-making is moved out of the hands of 
elected officials. In addition, the WTO agreements and DSU rulings are not ju-
dicially enforceable under U.S. or EU law, and thus, domestic courts are not an 
active part of the compliance process with global trade issues in the two largest 
trading states.52 
III.  DEVELOPING A SUPPLY-SIDE THEORY OF COMPLIANCE 
As the last Part illustrated, discussions of compliance with international 
trade law (or international law in general) focus on the demand side of compli-
ance, and as a result, treat the state as a unitary actor.53 An alternate view of 
the state—from the supply-side—would focus on the role that different gov-
ernment institutions have on compliance. It is our contention that this emphasis 
on the supply side rounds out the compliance picture. Government institutions 
mediate competing policy demands from domestic and foreign groups. This Ar-
ticle views political actors as having unique concerns and different abilities to 
act, instead of viewing the government as a single transmission belt for interest 
group pressure. Simply shifting compliance decision between political bodies 
within the same state can lead to different compliance outcomes. The Article 
explores this idea by examining U.S. compliance with adverse WTO decisions. 
In this Part, we first explain the U.S. compliance process, and then develop our 
argument for why the executive branch should be expected to comply more of-
ten and more quickly than Congress. After doing so, we outline the advantages 
and limitations of examining U.S. responses to WTO decisions to gain insight 
on the influence of domestic institutions on compliance outcomes. 
A. The U.S. Compliance Process 
Given the distribution of powers in the American system, who within the 
state has the authority to comply with the WTO ruling varies depending on the 
challenged policy. There are several actors who, for different types of policies, 
will have the power to comply with WTO law. Two actors, the executive 
branch and the Congress, are discussed below;54 although more can be rele-
 
 51. Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”? European Governments and the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121 (1998); Anne-Marie Burley (Slaughter) & Walter Mattli, 
Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 48. 
 52. Marco Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
442 (2005). 
 53. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2005) 
(“[W]e give the state the starring role in our drama.”); see also Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 45 (dis-
cussing U.S.-EU disputes); Guzman & Simmons, supra note 43 (discussing transfer payments between 
states). 
 54. These are the two primary actors in U.S. trade policy. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. YOUNG, 
UNITED STATES TRADE LAW & POLICY 147-48 (2001) (“[U]nder the peculiar U.S. constitutional system, 
the President and Congress share in some substantial measure the power and authority to formulate U.S. 
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vant.55 
1. The Executive Branch 
The President alone—that is, not acting through an administrative agen-
cy—has the power to comply with some rulings against the United States. 
Where the President has the independent authority to act, either because it falls 
within the executive branch’s constitutional powers or because of delegated 
power from Congress, the President can act unilaterally to supply compliance. 
For instance, the President acting alone can cure disputes regarding safeguard 
action.56 A safeguard is a domestic trade remedy that allows a state to raise tar-
iffs on imports when there is an unexpected surge in imports that injures or 
threatens to injure a domestic industry.57 In previous trade legislation, Con-
gress has delegated to the President the exclusive power to apply safeguard 
measures and to withdraw them.58 For instance, President Bush provided the 
steel industry with safeguard protection in 2002,59 and President Obama simi-
larly raised tariffs on imported tires in 2009.60 In both instances, the Interna-
tional Trade Commission—a bipartisan six member independent agency—had 
recommended that safeguards be imposed, but the President has the final deci-
sion on whether to impose the safeguard action and the level of protection to 
grant.61 The decision to withdraw the safeguard is also vested exclusively to 
the president’s discretion.62 When President Bush withdrew the steel safeguard 
 
Trade Policy.”) (emphasis omitted). It is also worth noting that many U.S. trade policy outcomes are 
shaped by conflict between the Executive branch and Congress. See WILLIAM H. LASH III, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: A PRIMER 6 (1998) (describing the “continuing battle between 
Congress and the Executive branch for primacy in trade matters”). 
 55. Congress and the Executive branch are two leading actors in compliance with international 
trade law, but other governmental entities can have supporting roles. The U.S. federal courts’ interpreta-
tion of statutory language or rulings on the limits of agency rule-making can either put the United States 
in violation of the WTO agreements or can be a source of compliance. Subnational state governments’ 
tax or subsidy programs can also cause and resolve trade complaints. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Crosby and the One-Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 1006-14 (2001) (dis-
cussing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)). 
 56. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 201, 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2411 (2012). For a discussion of 
the President’s power over safeguard issues, see Brewster, supra note 7, at 268. See also Daniel B. Pick-
ard & Tina Potuto Kimble, Can U.S. Safeguard Actions Survive WTO Review? Section 201 Investiga-
tions in International Trade Law, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 43 (2007) (discussing how the 
WTO has struck down safeguard actions taken by the United States). 
 57. Domestic trade remedies are trade actions imposed by the national authorities of the state. 
Three major actions are safeguard actions, anti-dumping duties, and countervailing duties. States are not 
required by the WTO to adopt domestic trade remedy rules, but WTO rules govern the application of 
these remedies if a state chooses to adopt them. For more information on these three actions, see Under-
standing the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). 
 58. See Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012). 
 59. For a brief description, see Benjamin H. Liebman, Safeguards, China, and the Price of 
Steel, 141 REV. WORLD ECON. 354, 354-55 (2006). 
 60. See Adam Eisenstein, Free Trade, Tires, and Tariffs: Why Imposing Import Duties Against 
Chinese Goods is the Wrong Cause of Action for the United States, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 305, 305 (2011). 
 61. A majority or tie vote of the International Trade Commission is required before the Presi-
dent can impose a safeguard action. Once the safeguard is authorized, the President has the sole authori-
ty to decide whether to impose the safeguard, how high the tariff should be, and what markets to exclude 
from the safeguard. The President can unilaterally alter or eliminate the safeguard action at any time. See 
Trade Act of 1974 § 204, 19 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 62. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2411. 
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measure in 2003, he could do so without the consent of Congress and without 
an agency determination that protection was no longer warranted.63 
Other trade issues are handled primarily by administrative agencies. The-
se include anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, as well as a host of 
regulations that have international trade effects. For instance, the Commerce 
Department issues rules regarding the methodology for dumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations that have led to adverse DSB decisions against the 
United States.64 The authorizing statute does not require a specific methodolo-
gy and the Commerce Department has significant discretion in developing the-
se rules. Here, the most immediate source of compliance is the Commerce De-
partment, which could alter its methodologies through its internal rule-making 
procedures. 
Other administrative agencies can also be the source of violations or 
compliance.65 As discussed in the Introduction, the State Department altered 
its internal rules for implementing a ban on imports of shrimp caught without 
turtle-exclusion devices.66 The relevant policy—the ban on the import of cer-
tain shrimp—was mandated by statute, but the State Department’s regulations 
implementing the statute were the source of the trade violation.67 Other federal 
agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Agriculture 
Department have also created and cured international trade violation through 
their rule-making processes.68 
Finally, the line between agency action and sole executive action can 
sometimes be blurred.69 The executive branch is structured as a hierarchy. Alt-
hough agencies are delegated power by the legislature, monitored by congres-
sional committees, and have to comply with rule-making procedures, the Presi-
dent has the power to appoint and dismiss top agency policymakers. Agency 
heads are members of the President’s Cabinet and presumably follow the Presi-
dent’s policy lead.70 This relationship makes parsing agency action and presi-
dential action difficult. In addition, Presidents are entering into sole executive 
agreements with foreign governments to alter administrative agency behavior. 
 
 63. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 269. 
 64. See GREG MATSEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAWS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 71-75 (1996). 
It is worth noting that we include a dummy variable for trade remedy cases to make sure that domestic 
trade remedy issues are not driving our results. For a longer discussion on this issue, see infra text ac-
companying notes 119-120. 
 65. For a discussion of the role that executive branch agencies play in U.S. trade policy, see 
YOUNG, supra note 54, at 12-13. 
 66. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
 67. For a discussion of the case, see Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environ-
mental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CALIF. L. REV. 31, 43-47 (2000). 
 68. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 
INT’L L. 901, 909-10 (1998) (discussing the EPA’s role in the U.S.—Gasoline dispute in the WTO) (cit-
ing Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R 
(May 30, 1997)). 
 69. For a general overview of presidential control over the administrative state, see Elena Ka-
gan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (arguing that there has been a trans-
formation that has turned executive agencies into an extension of the President’s policy agenda). 
 70. But see Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1755 (2013) (arguing that executive branch agencies often have considerable discretion). 
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For instance, the President has entered into international compacts regarding 
the long-standing Softwood Lumber dispute (addressing countervailing duty is-
sues)71  and controversies involving the methodology for calculating anti-
dumping duties.72 As sole executive agreements, these compacts do not need 
any legislative approval to enter into force.73 Sole executive agreements blur 
the line between executive action and agency action because they involve is-
sues within the agency’s policy scope but are addressed in executive agree-
ments. As a result, we group the administrative agencies and sole executive 
policies into one category of executive branch action. Although we believe that 
it may be fruitful for future research to explore the differences between execu-
tive agencies, this Article focuses on the distinction between the compliance 
efforts of the congressional and executive branches. 
2. Congress 
When the challenged policy is set by the text of a statute, compliance re-
quires engaging in the domestic statutory process.74 Here, the answer to the 
question of “who complies?” consists of multiple actors: bicameral majorities 
when there is presidential support of the legislation or veto-proof bicameral 
majorities when there is not presidential support. What issues require congres-
sional attention is defined by the nature of the trade law allegation and the do-
mestic governance system.75 If Congress has previously delegated policy pow-
er to an administrative agency and the agency has issued a ruling that creates 
the violation, then congressional action is not necessary to cure the violation. 
By contrast, if the violation requires a change to the statute, then Congress must 
act directly.76 Trade topics that generally need direct congressional action in-
clude intellectual property rules, tax law, and agriculture subsidies. 
The topics that require congressional action are not necessarily more po-
litically sensitive or considered higher stakes issues. Congress delegates to the 
 
 71. See generally DAOWEI ZHANG, THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, 
AND THE LONG U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE DISPUTE (2007) (providing a detailed account of the long-
standing U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute). 
 72. See generally Kamal Saggi & Mark Wu, Yet Another Nail in the Coffin of Zeroing: United 
States Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange 
Juice from Brazil, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 377 (2013). 
 73. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (discussing the President’s authority to 
enter into executive agreements with foreign countries); DANIEL C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 102 (2d ed. 2013) 
(discussing the differences between treaties and sole executive agreements). 
 74. For a discussion of U.S. statutes that have been challenged in the WTO, and thus require 
congressional action to remedy, see KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: 
READINGS, CASES, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS 565-66 (2009). 
 75. See generally YOUNG, supra note 54, at 14-19 (reviewing the role of Congress in U.S. 
trade policy). 
 76. For example, legislation allowing for distribution of anti-dumping duties was successfully 
challenged by a group of foreign governments before the WTO. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, 
United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN (Aug. 31, 
2004). This required congressional action to cure the violation. See KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 565. For 
more information on this case, see Jesse Kalproth, Decision by the Arbitrator—United States—
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: Payback Is for the Byrds: Arbitrator Allows Eight 
Countries to Sanction the United States for Application of the Byrd Amendment, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 401 (2005). 
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executive branch the ability to make determinations concerning sensitive top-
ics, such as relations with foreign nations, “unfair trade” practices that threaten 
import-competing firms (and local employment), as well as environmental and 
labor standards.77 There generally is a need for direct congressional action 
when Congress has not delegated implementation of a policy to an agency—as 
is often the case in intellectual property—or when the existence, not the im-
plementation, of a government policy is challenged. Thus, some very small- 
stakes issues require congressional action—such as a dispute over a single 
trademark78—while some high stakes issues—such as disputes over environ-
mental policy79—are delegated to the Executive. In addition, our study controls 
for the political contributions of the affected industries, which accounts for is-
sues that are politically sensitive because of interest group politics. 
The discussion of the domestic government’s supply of compliance raises 
an additional issue that can usefully be addressed here. Compliance with inter-
national trade rules can almost always be achieved through a statutory enact-
ment. Except for rare constitutional cases, such as individual rights issues or 
federalism issues (which rarely arise in international trade), Congress has ple-
nary power over foreign commerce.80 Thus, any government act that violates 
international trade law can be corrected through statutory means. For instance, 
Congress could amend American anti-dumping rules to prohibit the use of cer-
tain methodologies (or anti-dumping duties entirely) even if the Commerce De-
partment refused to amend its internal rules. While this is true, collapsing the 
existing domestic political system of compliance into the statutory process ig-
nores sources of compliance that may be far easier to achieve than changes to 
federal legislation. The federal legislative process represents a very high bar in 
terms of the difficulty in achieving policy change. Significant political capital is 
necessary to get an issue on the legislative agenda and there are multiple veto 
points in the legislative process. In addition, to view all compliance as a matter 
 
 77. For a partial list of specific delegations of authority over trade related issues from Con-
gress to the executive branch, see JAE WAN CHUNG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: U.S. TRADE LAW, POLICY, AND SOCIAL COST 101-02 (2006). 
 78. For example, compliance with the WTO dispute resolution process in the Havana Club 
Rum case, which is a dispute over a specific trademark, required Congressional Action. See, e.g., Appel-
late Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R 
(Jan. 2, 2002); Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R 
(June 15, 2000). For more information on this case, see Donald R. Dinan, An Analysis of the United 
States—Cuba “Havana Club” Rum Case before the World Trade Organization, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
337 (2002); and Emily Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just “Cuba Coke,” 24 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 513 (2003). 
 79. For example, compliance with the WTO dispute resolution process in the Shrimp/Turtle 
case, which is a dispute over environmental regulations, requires executive branch action. See Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). For more information on this dispute, see Mark Wu & James Salzman, 
The Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy (Apr. 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/facultyworkshops/ 
wu.faculty.workshop.spring-2013.pdf. 
 80. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (specifying that “[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises”); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (specifying that “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”); see also LASH, supra 
note 54, at 1 (“Congress has the plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce . . . .”); YOUNG, supra 
note 54, at 25 (“[I]n the field of international economic affairs, significant power has been granted to 
Congress by the Constitution.”). 
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of legislation ignores long-standing governmental practice regarding compli-
ance with international rules. 
B. Domestic Institutions and Rates of Compliance 
As we have just explained, which branch of the U.S. government has the 
authority to comply with adverse WTO decisions varies based on the issue. 
This does not mean, however, that both the executive branch and Congress 
should be viewed as equally likely to comply (as unitary actor models assume). 
Instead, we hypothesize both that the executive branch is more likely to com-
ply, and also that it will do so more quickly. 
We hold this view for several reasons. First, the executive branch is 
uniquely concerned with foreign policy.81 Compared to Congress, the execu-
tive branch is responsible for maintaining good foreign relations and its per-
formance is evaluated more based on foreign policy success. While there are 
foreign relations committees, members of Congress are less engaged in interna-
tional affairs. Second, domestic institutions have varying capacities to act and 
act quickly.82 The executive branch has fewer veto players than congressional 
action does.83 The president can unilaterally act in some areas of foreign affairs 
and can form sole executive agreements that regulate some elements of admin-
istrative law.84 Executive agencies have more complicated procedures for al-
 
 81. The Executive branch is widely viewed as having special expertise and discretion when 
conducting foreign affairs. This fact has been recognized by a number of judges, policy makers, and 
scholars. For example, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the Executive branch’s domain 
in international affairs. See, e.g., Unites States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(referring to the Executive branch as the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations.”). There is also an expansive literature in political science on the “Two Presidencies,” 
which essentially argues that the executive branch has different powers over foreign affairs and domestic 
affairs. See, e.g., BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO LEADS WHOM: PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE 
PUBLIC (2006); B. Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell & David Lewis, Toward a Broader Understanding 
of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis, 70 J. POL. 1 (2008); A. Wil-
davsky, The Two Presidencies, 4 TRANS-ACTION 7 (1966); Helen V. Milner & Dustin Tingley, Sailing 
the Water’s Edge: Where Domestic Politics Meets Foreign Policy (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/milnertingleywatersedge.pdf. Although it 
is fair to say that the executive branch has a great interest in and control over foreign policy, it is worth 
noting that there has been a lively debate in legal scholarship over exactly how much deference should 
be given to the Executive branch. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Af-
fairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Af-
fairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism 
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presi-
dential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013); Derek 
Jinks & Neal Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Julian Ku & 
John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive 
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179 (2006); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007). 
 82. Comparative institutional competency is a widely discussed topic in law and political sci-
ence. For a brief review, see Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
and Comparative Institutional Competency, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). See also NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1997) (discussing institutional comparisons). 
 83. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 
(1998) (discussing veto points in the U.S. political system and their influence on policy making). 
 84. See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 160-80 (2011) (reviewing areas where the executive branch has unilateral pow-
er over foreign affairs). 
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tering regulations and these regulations are subject to legal challenge, but agen-
cies act as a part of the hierarchical structure of the executive branch. By con-
trast, decision-making in Congress is more difficult.85 Bicameralism and super-
majority voting rules in the Senate establish barriers to altering status quo poli-
cies.86 
Applied to WTO litigation, this model predicts that compliance will be 
lower if congressional action is necessary to supply compliance. Congress has 
fewer interests than the executive branch in having high levels of compliance 
with international law to maintain good foreign relations. In addition, Congress 
has a more difficult time acting to change established policies than the execu-
tive branch. All else being equal, we expect that the executive branch will 
comply with adverse WTO decisions more often and in a shorter period of time 
than Congress will. 
C. Advantages and Limitations of Our Approach 
Before proceeding to the discussion of our data collection and results, it is 
worth noting that our decision to study the supply side of compliance by focus-
ing on U.S. compliance with adverse DSB decisions has both advantages and 
limitations. We will briefly discuss both. 
An advantage of studying compliance in the WTO setting is the existence 
of a dispute resolution system with compulsory jurisdiction. This resolves the 
problem of auto-interpretation in international law: governments will frequently 
dispute whether a violation of international law exists and, without a third party 
adjudicator, it is hard to collect an objective sample of “violations.” Compulso-
ry jurisdiction also solves a selection bias issue. If dispute resolution is volun-
tary and the parties only agree to adjudicate “politically easy” cases, then the 
sample of decisions may be biased (because the “politically hard” cases are 
never heard). The results of these studies may be overly optimistic in terms of 
states’ willingness to comply with adjudicatory rulings. The WTO’s compulso-
ry jurisdiction decreases this selection bias because the respondent state need 
not agree for the adjudicatory system to proceed. The WTO dispute resolution 
system additionally has one of the highest caseloads for an international dispute 
resolution system, so there are a sufficient number of cases to provide a mean-
ingful quantitative analysis. 
Of course, our sample of WTO cases may still have problems with selec-
tion bias. Some trade disputes may be resolved through diplomatic means be-
fore a request for consultation is ever filed at the WTO. If so, then these cases 
do not become part of our data set. As a result, our data set may be biased in the 
sense that the dispute has to be difficult enough to resolve that it cannot be 
handled diplomatically. In addition, some disputes will not involve a sufficient 
quantity of trade to be worthy of the expense and energy of international litiga-
tion. Some states may also not have the financial or legal capacity to meaning-
fully engage the WTO system, and thus, will engage the dispute resolution sys-
 
 85. See KREHBIEL, supra note 83. 
 86. Id. 
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tem less frequently than states with greater financial and legal capacities. This 
tendency to avoid WTO litigation may also be heightened when the United 
States is the respondent state because developing countries may fear a diplo-
matic backlash to trade litigation.87 On the whole, the data set is not free of se-
lection bias concerns, but it provides a good sample of cases involving a variety 
of trade issues brought by a wide range of complaining states. 
Our study also focuses exclusively on the United States as the respondent 
in WTO litigation. We do so because we are interested in how the domestic in-
stitutional source of trade policy influences a state’s compliance behavior, and 
therefore, we must open the “black box” of the state’s decision-making. This is 
a state specific inquiry. We have chosen to look to the United States because it 
is a frequent party to trade litigation and we are familiar with its trade policy 
processes.88 The inquiry is highly relevant to understanding patterns of trade 
law adjudication—the United States is one of the most common defendants at 
the WTO—but this comes with some limitations. Because our study focuses on 
one governmental structure, it may not be generalizable to all states. In addi-
tion, the economic power of the United States may provide its government with 
a greater capacity to resist international calls for compliance; thus its rates of 
non-compliance may be higher than in other states.89 However, understanding 
how international law and international adjudicative decisions influence policy 
in economically powerful states like the United States provides important in-
sight into constraining effects of international law. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the decision to focus solely on the U.S. re-
sponse to adverse DSB decisions necessarily means that our study has a small 
sample size. In fact, there are only thirty-seven observations used in our prima-
ry analysis. As a consequence, it is important to caution that future studies that 
are able to examine a larger sample of cases may produce different results. 
IV. DATA 
To test these expectations, we have built an original dataset of disputes 
filed against the United States in the WTO.90 Because our theory makes specif-
ic predictions on how the identity of the actor that is required to comply influ-
 
 87. See, e.g., Davis & Bermeo, supra note 43, at 1035 (“Small developing states may feel con-
strained from initiating a case against their larger trade partners because they do not anticipate that they 
will be able to gain concessions or because they fear losing aid or preferential trade.”). 
 88. Other scholars, who have better knowledge of domestic compliance procedures in other 
states, could conduct similar studies. The domestic supply of compliance with WTO adjudicatory deci-
sions depends on the nation’s internal legal rules and delegation of powers to various branches of gov-
ernment. Such a state-by-state analysis requires knowledge of the nation’s formal rules as well as its 
informal government practices. 
 89. The American dualist legal structure may also give political actors in the U.S. government 
more domestic legal leeway to resist implementation of international legal rulings. We do not want to 
emphasize this point too strongly, however, because other more monist states also give political actors 
greater leeway with regards to international trade obligations. See Bronckers, supra note 48. 
 90. All of the replication code and data collected for this project will be made publically avail-
able. For a discussion of the importance of releasing replication data, see Allan Dafoe, Science Deserves 
Better: The Imperative to Share Complete Replication Files (June 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/m1l1842pjeb5d45/13-05-04%20science%20deserves% 
20better.pdf. 
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ences whether and when compliance will occur, we have collected a large 
amount of information on each dispute that has not previously been collected or 
analyzed by scholars. In this Part, we briefly outline the process we have used 
to construct the dataset built for our project and explain the coding decisions 
that we made along the way. First, we outline the universe of cases that is in-
cluded within our dataset. Second, we discuss the dependent variables used to 
test our theory. Third, we describe the independent variables that we have col-
lected to test our theory of compliance. 
A. Universe of Cases 
The first decision that we made while constructing our dataset is deter-
mining which cases to include. We initially limited our analysis to disputes ini-
tiated against the United States in the WTO prior to 2012.91 As of December 
31, 2011, there had been 113 requests for consultations filed with the WTO in 
which the United States was the respondent.92 It would be inappropriate to as-
sume based on this fact, however, that the correct number of observations to 
look at to test our hypothesis would be 113 cases. This is because the total of 
113 cases includes disputes that were consolidated, and cases where the United 
States prevailed (thus not requiring the United States to have to take subsequent 
compliance actions). Additionally, in many cases it would be inappropriate to 
include cases that were settled before litigation was completed. As a result, de-
termining the universe of cases for our study required in-depth classification of 
all of the requests for consultation with the United States filed at the WTO. 
Given these concerns, we used a three-step process to cull the cases to 
give us our final universe of cases. First, any disputes that were either consoli-
dated with earlier cases or repeats of earlier cases on the exact topic were 
turned into a single dispute. For example, United States—Gasoline93 brought 
by Venezuela and United States—Gasoline94 brought by Brazil were consoli-
dated into a single observation because they were consolidated during the dis-
pute resolution process. Likewise, United States—Measures Affecting Textiles 
and Apparel Products95 and United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and 
Apparel Products (II)96 were treated the same way because they were both 
cases brought by the European Union on the same issue. This resulted in 23 
 
 91. We made this decision for two reasons. First, by limiting our analysis to cases initiated 
before 2012, we were able to analyze cases that had at least some time to work through the DSU pro-
cess. Second, by limiting our time in this way we were able to ensure that independent variables from 
external datasets were available for all of the disputes in our dataset. If we were to have analyzed more 
recent cases, this may not have been possible. 
 92. See Current Status of Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
 93. United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2 (Con-
sultations Requested on Jan. 24, 1996) (Complaint: Venezuela).  
 94.  United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS4 (Con-
sultations Requested on Apr. 10, 1995) (Complaint: Brazil). 
 95.  United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and Apparel Products, WT/DS85 (Consulta-
tions Requested on May 22, 1997). 
 96. United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and Apparel Products (II), WT/DS151 (Con-
sultations Requested on Nov. 19, 1998). 
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cases being removed from the initial 113 disputes.97 Second, since the United 
States is not expected to take steps to comply in disputes that it either won or 
disputes where litigation is still ongoing, these cases were also removed from 
the dataset. To identify these cases, we relied on a document produced by the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Office that identified cases where the Unit-
ed States “won on the core issue(s).”98 This resulted in 35 additional disputes 
being excluded from the dataset. 
Third, we excluded cases that were settled without the litigation process 
being completed. We compiled this list both by relying on the USTR document 
previously mentioned99 and the reported status of cases reported on the WTO 
website. This resulted in 18 additional cases being removed from our dataset.100 
After these steps, we were left with 37 cases where the United States did not 
prevail on the core issue at stake in the dispute that formed the primary uni-
verse of cases for our empirical tests.101 Table 1 presents a breakdown of the 
113 disputes filed with the WTO prior to December 31, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of the Universe of Cases 
Category of Cases Total Cases 
Consolidated or Repeat Cases 23 
U.S. Prevailed on Core Issue / Monitoring in Progress 35 
U.S. Settled / No Longer in Progress (“Settled Cases”) 18 
U.S. Did Not Prevail on Core Issue  
Dispute Resolved (“Compliant Cases”) 24 
Dispute Not Resolved (“Non-Compliant Cases”) 13 
Total Cases 113 
 
 97. For a discussion of how consolidated cases and cases brought by multiple complaints were 
treated for coding, see infra notes 112, 114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of an alternative 
approach that we took to address these cases, see infra notes 166-168, and accompanying text.  
 98. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE U.S. (2011). 
 99. Id. 
 100. We still collected compliance information on all of the cases that were settled, which we 
used to provide a robustness check to our primary results. See infra text accompanying notes 164-165. 
 101. The complete list of cases included in our dataset is available in Appendix C. 
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B. Dependent Variables 
After establishing our universe of cases, the second task was to determine 
the relevant dependent variables to test our theory. In our cases, there are two 
outcomes that we were primarily interested in: (1) whether compliance oc-
curred; and (2) how long it took compliance to occur. 
The first task was to determine how to code whether compliance has oc-
curred in a given dispute. Determining how to do so was made easier by a Con-
gressional Research Service report that documents the status of the WTO dis-
putes that the United States has been part of at the end of the year. The report 
used for our study was published on April 23, 2012.102 That report listed 13 
cases where the United States is currently not in full compliance with the 
WTO’s decision.103 These cases were thus coded as “1” (“non-compliant”), 
whereas the other 24 cases that the United States lost but did not settle were 
coded as “0” (“compliant”). This then became the dependent variable for the 
results presented in Part V.A.104 
The second task was to determine how to code the length of time it took 
for compliance to occur. To do so, we collected data on the date that each con-
ference request was filed.105 We then also collected data on the date that the 
United States complied by curing the violation found in the WTO litigation. 
Measuring the end date was complicated and defining an exact date proved to 
be difficult. In constructing this variable, we first checked reports filed with the 
DSB and looked for when the complainant states reported that compliance had 
occurred. After doing so, we then checked the Federal Register to determine the 
exact date that the compliance action occurred. When possible, we then used 
 
 102. JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32014, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 
STATUS OF U.S. COMPLIANCE IN PENDING CASES (2012). 
 103. These thirteen cases are: United States—Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/DS160 
(Consultations Requested on Jan. 26, 1999); United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, WT/DS176 (Consultations Requested on Jul. 08, 1999); United States—Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184 (Consultations Requested on Nov. 18, 
1999); United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217 (Consultations 
Requested on Dec. 21, 2000); United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS234 (Consultations Requested on May 21, 2001); United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267 (Consultations Requested on Sep. 27, 2002), United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Consultations Requested on Mar. 13, 
2003); United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zero-
ing), WT/DS294 (Consultations Requested on Jun. 12, 2003); United States—Measures Relating to Ze-
roing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322 (Consultations Requested on Nov. 24, 2004); United States—
Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344 (Consultations Requested on 
May 26, 2006); United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 
WT/DS350 (Consultations Requested on Oct. 2, 2006); United States—Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft—Second Complaint, WT/DS353 (Consultations Requested on Jun. 27, 2005); Unit-
ed States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS379 (Consultations Requested on Sep. 19, 2008); United States—Anti-Dumping Administrative 
Reviews and Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382 
(Consultations Requested on Nov. 27, 2008); and United States—Anti-dumping Measures on Certain 
Shrimp from Viet Nam, WT/DS404 (Consultations Requested on Feb. 01, 2010). 
 104. The Congressional Research Service Report was reported before the United States reached 
an agreement on zeroing cases in February 2012. We attempt to address this issue in our section on ro-
bustness. See infra text accompanying notes 163-164. 
 105. In cases where the complaint was consolidated, the earlier conference request date was 
used. 
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this as the end date for the total compliance time. When we could not determine 
a date via the Federal Register, we used the date that the complainant state re-
ported to the DSB that the United States was now compliant.106 Finally, for 
cases categorized by the Congressional Research Service as not being fully 
compliant, we recorded the date that partial compliance occurred; for the three 
cases where no compliance actions had been taken, we treated these cases as 
censored observations.107 After collecting an end compliance date for each 
case, we then calculated the number of days that elapsed between when the 
consultation request was filed and when compliance occurred. This served as 
the dependent variable for the results reported in Part V.B. Table 2 presents 
summary information for the dependent variables. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Dependent Variable Collection 
Category Total Cases 
Number of Days Until   
Compliance (mean) 
Compliant Cases 24 1,022 
Non-Compliant Cases 13 2,254 
Overall 37 1,455 
C. Independent Variables 
The third step that we took to construct our dataset for this project was to 
collect a range of independent variables that allowed us to operationalize and 
test our theory of compliance along with competing explanations for if, and 
when, the United States complies with adverse WTO rulings. We did this by 
collecting independent variables that capture four features of each dispute. 
First, we collected two variables that attempt to capture relevant domestic 
political features of each dispute. The first variable, Congress Required, is 
whether congressional action would be required to bring the offending measure 
into compliance. This is the most critical variable to our paper, and was de-
signed to help us test our theory that the actor expected to supply compliance is 
a major factor in determining how and when the United States takes steps to 
comply with WTO decisions. This is a dummy variable coded as “1” (“yes”) if 
Congress would have to take a vote to remove or change legislation to remedy 
a violation alleged in the initial complaint. The variable was coded as “0” 
(“no”) if the United States could become compliant by either allowing a meas-
ure to expire, or by the president or an executive agency taking unilateral ac-
tion.108 The second variable in this category is whether there was Divided Gov-
 
 106. A list of the sources used to code the compliance data is provided in Appendix C. Appen-
dix C lists WTO sources that were used to code this dependent variable, as well as citations to official 
U.S. government documents (primarily the Federal Register).  
 107. See GRIMMETT, supra note 102. The three cases in which the United States is completely 
non-compliant are: US—Section 211 Appropriations Act, WT/DS176; US—Gambling, WT/DS285; and 
US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379. 
 108. Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability of the coding of this variable. First, the 
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ernment at the time a complaint was filed. This is a dummy variable that was 
coded as “1” (“yes”) if the president’s party did not control both houses of 
Congress, and “0” (“no”) otherwise. The justification for including this variable 
in our analysis is that there is evidence that divided government influences the 
American patterns of adjudication in the WTO.109 
Second, we collected two variables that are designed to capture the rela-
tionship between the United States and the complainant(s). The variable USA 
Exports attempts to capture the trading relationship between the two coun-
tries.110 The variable is a natural log of the total value of the exports from the 
United States to the complainant’s country in the year the conference request 
was filed.111 In cases of multiple complainants, the total value of the exports 
for the complainant countries was added together.112 Additionally, a dummy 
variable was coded for whether the United States has a Formal Alliance with 
any of the complainant states. This variable is included because there is evi-
dence that alliances influence the likelihood of trade disputes in the WTO.113 A 
dispute was only coded as “1” (“yes”) if one of the complainant countries had a 
“Type 1” alliance according to the Correlates of War dataset, which signifies 
that the United States has a formal military alliance with one of the countries 
that initiated the dispute.114 All countries without a Type 1 alliance with the 
 
variable was coded blind based on the content of the initial complaint. Second, the coding of this varia-
ble was then discussed with other scholars who have expertise in international trade. The result was that 
seven cases were coded as requiring congressional action: United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108 (Consultations Requested on Nov. 18, 1997); United States—Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136 (Consultations Requested on Jun. 4, 1998); United States—Sections 
301-310 of the Trade Act 1974, WT/DS152 (Consultations Requested on Nov. 25, 1998); US—Section 
110(5) Copyright Act, WT/DS160; United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162 (Consulta-
tions Requested on Feb. 10, 1999); US—Section 211 Appropriations Act, WT/DS176; US—Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217; US—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), WT/DS234; US—Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267; and US—Gambling, WT/DS285. In addition, we also attempted to use several alternative 
codings of this variable in order to avoid the possibility that our substantive results were a consequence 
of any questionable coding decisions. For a discussion of an alternative approach used to code this vari-
able, see infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text. 
 109. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 63. Davis’s evidence suggests that divided government influ-
ences the decision to bring WTO disputes as a complainant, but her basic argument that constraints on 
the Executive make negotiations more difficult would suggest it would be more difficult to quickly settle 
disputes when the United States is the respondent. 
 110. We also collected data on the flow of imports from the complainant state to the United 
States. We did not include an “imports” variable in the analysis that we present in this paper because the 
correlation with exports was 0.95. Substituting imports for exports does not substantively change our 
results. 
 111. This source for this data is the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign 
Trade Div., Trade Flow Data for 2011, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/about (last visited Apr. 19, 
2014).  
 112. For a discussion of an alternative approach used for cases with multiple complainants, see 
infra text accompanying notes 166-168. 
 113. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 92-100. It is worth noting that there are many other recent 
studies on WTO disputes that do not include a variable for alliances between dyads. Id. at 93. We be-
lieve, however, that after Davis’ research it is appropriate to include this measure. 
 114. This data is from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset. Alliances (v. 4.01), 
CORRELATES OF WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Alliances/alliance.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014). See Douglas M. Gibler & Merideth R. Sarkees, Measuring Alliance: The Corre-
lates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000, 41 J. PEACE RESOL. 211 (2004); see also 
DOUGLAS M. GIBLER, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES, 1648-2008 (2009). It is worth noting that 
we have elected to use the “COW” Alliance data set as opposed to the “ATOP” dataset. Although the 
ATOP dataset was used by Davis, the ATOP data is only available through 2004. See DAVIS, supra note 
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United States were coded as “0” (“no”). 
Third, we collected three variables that were designed to capture the rele-
vant characteristics of the country—or countries in disputes with multiple com-
plainants—that initiated the dispute. The natural log of the country’s GDP Per 
Capita was recorded for the year that the request for consultation was filed.115 
Additionally, the natural log of the Population was recorded for the year that 
the request for consultation was filed.116 Finally, as a measure of the complain-
ant countries’ regime, we use the country’s Polity Score. This is a measure of 
whether a country is autocratic or democratic on a scale of -10 to 10. This vari-
able is based on the “polity2” variable from the Polity IV project.117 
Fourth, we collected two variables that capture the characteristics of the 
individual dispute.118 For the first, we coded whether each case was a Trade 
Remedy Case.119 This is because there is reason to believe that the United 
States has a particularly harsh reaction to trade remedy disputes.120 Disputes 
were coded as Trade Remedy cases if they were classified by the WTO for be-
ing about anti-dumping, safeguards, or countervailing measures. For the se-
cond, we coded the Contributions made in the United States by interest groups 
and lobbyists representing the sector at issue in each dispute. This variable is 
important because it has been understood that interest groups have a significant 
influence on U.S. trade policy.121 As a result, we coded each dispute as relating 
to one of thirteen sectors based on a categorization scheme developed by the 
Center for Responsive Politics.122 The total political contributions made by 
 
43, at 94. In contrast, the COW data is extended to 2008, and thus covers a greater portion of our sam-
ple. See Gibler & Sarkees, supra. 
 115. This data is from the World Bank Development Indicators. World Development Indicators, 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last visited Mar. 
12, 2013). Since Taiwan is not included in the World Bank data, Taiwan’s GDP Per Capita was taken 
from the CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 116. See World Development Indicators, supra note 115. 
 117. See Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristic and Transitions, 1800-2012, CENTER. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (last updated June 10, 2013). Our coding required making 
three adjustments due to limitations of the polity data. First, the European Union was given a value of 
“10” in all years. Second, Antigua and Barbuda are not included in the Polity IV dataset, but were coded 
as 5 based on a value of 4 in the Freedom House Political Freedom Index (which translated to a polity 
score of 5 for other countries with the same Freedom House score). Third, disputes with multiple com-
plainants had their polity score averaged. 
 118. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly control for the “value” of the dispute. The value 
of dispute is not determined during the dispute resolution process and is only set if retaliation is author-
ized (which happens rarely). Additionally, the parties tend to have vastly different views of the amount 
of trade losses—i.e. in the U.S.-Antigua gambling dispute, the United States argued that the annual val-
ue of the lost trade was $3.3 million, Antigua put it at $3.443 billion, and the panel finally awarded $21 
million. See Report of the Arbitrator, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007). 
 119. Trade Remedies are policy responses that are taken in response to adverse consequences of 
trade policies. For general information, see KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 547-48. 
 120. See William F. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 17, 24-25 (2005) (“[I]n terms of controversy, the WTO dispute settlement system has 
been controversial in recent times mainly because of the very critical reaction in Washington to US loss-
es in . . . trade remedy cases.”). 
 121. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 54, at 161-62. 
 122. Information on this data is available at About the Data in These Industry Profiles, CENTER. 
RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/methodology.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
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each sector to candidates and committees in the election cycle prior to when the 
request for consultation was filed was then taken.123 Although scholars have 
used both political contributions124 and sector employment125 as measures of 
the political influence of industries when studying compliance with WTO deci-
sions, we believe that using the political contributions variable is the most di-
rect way to capture which industries will have political clout that might influ-
ence the U.S. government’s compliance decisions.126  Table 3 provides a 
summary of the independent variables.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Variables Included in the Dataset 
Category Variable Values Source 
OUTCOMES 
 Compliance 0=no; 1=yes CRS Report 
 Compliance Time  Various Sources 
    
DOMESTIC FACTORS   
 Congress Required 0=no; 1=yes Various Sources 
 Divided  
Government 
0=no; 1=yes Database of  
Political  
Institutions 
    
RELATIONSHIP FACTORS   
 U.S. Exports 4.85 (min) to 
13.30 (max) 
Dep’t of  
Commerce 
 
 123. There are two types of cases for which it is difficult to classify which sector of the econo-
my is affected. First, for zeroing cases we used “steel” as the affected industry because the underlying 
products were primarily forms of steel (e.g., steel bearings). Second, to provide the most difficult test for 
our theory, for cases that did not directly implicate a specific industry (e.g., United States—Tax Treat-
ment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108 (Consultations Requested on Nov. 18, 1997)), we 
classified these disputes as being part of the sector with the highest donations in the previous election 
cycle. 
 124. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 126-27. 
 125. See Hofmann & Kim, supra note 50. 
 126. It should be noted that the natural log of this variable was used in our analysis. 
 127. Summary statistics for the independent variables are in Appendix A. 
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 Formal Alliance 0=no; 1=yes COW Formal Alli-
ance Dataset 
    
COMPLAINANT CHARACTERISTICS  
 GDP Per Capita 6.01 (min) to 
12.02 (max) 
World Bank De-
velopment Indica-
tors 
 Population 11.31 (min) to 
21.57 (max) 
World Bank De-
velopment Indica-
tors 
 Polity Score -10 (min) to  
10 (max) 
Polity IV  
Project 
    
DISPUTE FACTORS  
 Trade Remedy 
Case 
0=no; 1=yes Various Sources 
 Political  
Contributions 
17.62 (min) to 
19.86 (max) 
Center for  
Responsive  
Politics 
 
 
V. RESULTS 
After building this original dataset, we performed a number of statistical 
tests to determine whether the domestic sources of policy actions needed to 
bring the United States into compliance with WTO decisions directly influ-
enced whether and when the United States complied. In this Part, we present 
the results of those tests. First, we present models that estimate the influence 
the Congress Required variable and other variables have on whether the United 
States actually complied with the WTO’s ruling. Second, we present models 
that estimate the influence of the Congress Required variable on the amount of 
total time that elapsed from when a conference request was filed until the Unit-
ed States came into compliance. Third, we discuss a series of robustness checks 
that we performed to try and ensure that our results were not merely a result of 
coding decisions or model dependency. All of our results provided strong sup-
port to our theory that the actor required to comply is a significant determinate 
of if, and when, the United States complies with WTO decisions. 
A. Compliance 
The first test of our theory that we performed is estimating the impact of 
whether Congress was required to act on whether the United States fully com-
plied with the WTO’s rulings. For this test, the number of observations was the 
37 disputes that the United States did not settle or where the United States did 
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not prevail on the core issue in the dispute. Of these 37 cases, there were 13 
disputes where the United States was not being fully compliant as of January 
25, 2012. We then estimated a series of logit models that estimated the impact 
that a range of variables had on whether a case would be one of the 13 non-
compliant cases.128 Logit analysis is a standard social science method of ana-
lyzing how independent variables influence a binary outcome129; in our case, 
compliance with the WTO’s ruling. Figure 1 presents the results of these 
tests.130 
 
 
 
Figure 1 presents our statistical results graphically.131 Each box is a logit 
 
 128. It is worth noting that the decision to use logit models, as opposed to probit models, did 
not substantively affect our results. 
 129. See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSIONS AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 79 (2007). 
 130. All statistical analysis for this study was conducted using “Zelig” for R. See Kosuke Imai, 
Gary King & Olivia Lau, Toward a Common Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development, 17 J. 
COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STAT. 892 (2008); see also Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software, 
HARV.  U. INST. FOR QUANTITATIVE SOC. SCI., http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014) (describing the purpose and functions of “Zelig”). 
 131. For a defense of the merits of presenting regression results graphically, see Jonathan P. 
Kastellec & Eduardo L. Leoni, Using Graphs Instead of Tables in Political Science, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 
755 (2007). For traditional regression tables, see Appendix B. 
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Figure 1: Logit Models Estimating Likelihood of Non-Compliance
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model estimating compliance with WTO decisions as the dependent variable. 
The Figure presents the simulated first differences as each variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum value.132 In each of the three boxes, every line rep-
resents the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval for an individual 
variable included within the model.133 Point estimates to the right of zero mean 
that the variable is associated with a high probability of non-compliance. Statis-
tically significant variables are presented as solid lines, and all others are dotted 
lines. 
As Figure 1 clearly shows, in each of the three models estimated, disputes 
where Congress was required to act are associated with roughly a 50% higher 
probability that the United States will be non-compliant with a WTO decision. 
This ranges from a 42% higher probability in Model 1 to a 63% higher proba-
bility in Model 3. This result is consistent with the parsimonious model pre-
sented in Model 1,134 when controlling for a range of independent variables 
that account for alternative explanations in Model 2,135 and even when includ-
ing data on the political contributions associated with the relevant sector of the 
economy at issue in the dispute in Model 3.136 In fact, not only is the Congress 
Required variable significant in each model presented, it is the only variable 
that achieves statistical significance at the five percent level.137 These results 
thus lend strong support to our theory that the institutional source of domestic 
policy action is a significant component of the state’s decision of whether to 
comply with WTO decisions. 
Figure 1 also provides evidence on what other factors influence, or do not 
influence, compliance decisions. These results should not only be of interest to 
scholars of international trade, but also scholars of international relations more 
broadly.138 The results in neither Model 2 nor Model 3 provide any evidence 
that characteristics about the complaining state or states influence the U.S. 
government’s likelihood of complying with WTO decisions. Interestingly, the 
level of U.S. exports to the complaining state, which is a measure of the 
potential retaliatory capability of the complaining state, does not have any 
stastically significant effects. 139  This is contrary to realists 140  and 
 
 132. For a discussion of the merits of using simulated first differences, see Gary King, Michael 
Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and 
Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341 (2000). See also GARY KING, UNIFYING POLITICAL 
METHODOLOGY: THE LIKELIHOOD THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 107-08 (1998) (providing a 
technical discussion of simulating first differences for producing quantities of interest from regressions). 
 133. We include the line representing the confidence interval because all statistical estimates 
have a certain degree of uncertainty. The intuition for including a line with the confidence interval is that 
we can say with 95% confidence that the true estimate of the effect of a given variable falls within the 
confidence interval that we present. 
 134. P-value = 0.04. 
 135. P-value = 0.04. 
 136. P-value = 0.04. 
 137. The Divided Government variable narrowly misses statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
in Models 2 and 3. In Model 2, the p-value for Divided Government is 0.07. In Model 3, the p-value for 
Divided Government is 0.06. 
 138. For an easy to follow review of the major theories of international relations, see Stephen 
M. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, 110 FOREIGN POL’Y 29 (1998). 
 139. In Model 2, the p-value for USA Exports is 0.32. In Model 3, the p-value for USA Exports 
is 0.42. 
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institutionalists 141  approaches to international relations expectations that 
concerns for retaliation or reciprocity are driving governments’ compliance 
decisions. In addition, the existence of other formal alliances with complaining 
states also does not have a statisticaly significant influence on compliance.142 
While this finding does not disprove the institutionalist’s expectation that 
having more formal treaty alliances will lead to greater linkages between 
regimes and thus greater compliance in all regimes,143 the evidence is not 
supportive of the idea that a web of treaty relationships between country dyads 
will improve compliance. In addition, the results of Model 2 and Model 3 do 
not support the conjecture by liberal theory that democracies will be more 
likely to comply with international obligations when dealing with other 
democracies.144 A higher polity score, indicating more democratic institutions, 
 
 140. Realist approaches to international law and international relations focus primarily on the 
perceived national interests of the state and the distribution of power within the international system. 
Realist approaches to international law question whether treaty rules or customary law are a real con-
straint on state action or simply a reflection of powerful state preferences. Most realist accounts adopt a 
model of state decision-making that is unitary and focused on external threats. Because of the over-
whelming effects of the international system’s constant security competition on states, governments 
must take the actions that maintain the state’s power. Realists downplay the importance of domestic pol-
itics, describing state decision-making as essentially identical even though domestic political systems 
may vary significantly. The importance of systemic threats leads realists to expect political bodies with-
in a state to respond similarly (if not identically) to external pressure, even on economic issues. For ex-
amples of realist thinking on international law and international relations, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, 
supra note 53; and John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L 
SECURITY 5 (1994). 
 141. Institutionalist approaches to compliance are also focused on the competitive pressures of 
the international system on state decision-making, but anticipate that the structure of the regime itself 
may promote compliance. Institutions can build webs of cooperation and establish linkages across issue 
areas. Failure to cooperate in one issue area reverberates throughout the international system and raises 
the costs of non-compliance. For instance, establishing a legal regime engages the state’s reputation for 
abiding by its promises and creates incentives for states to comply with its cooperative obligations. Insti-
tutional theory views states as being in a security competition, but does not view this competition as an 
overwhelming concern as realists do. Relative power considerations are not so dominant that govern-
ments cannot decide to cooperate with one another on a variety of economic or military issues. As such, 
institutionalists understand states as having more space for policy choice, and correspondingly, a greater 
possible role for domestic politics. Nonetheless, institutionalists would not necessarily expect that dif-
ferent parts of the government would respond differently to international pressure and do not have any 
specific predictions for how the supply of a policy would influence its content. For examples of institu-
tionalist thinking on international law and international relations, see ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); GUZMAN, supra 
note 48. 
 142. In Model 2, the p-value for Formal Alliance is 0.18. In Model 3, the p-value for Formal 
Alliance is 0.18. 
 143. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 141. 
 144. Liberal theory provides a more differentiated view of state decision-making. Liberal theory 
argues that states act in systemically different ways depending on their form of government and the poli-
cy preferences of sub-state actors. In one notable variant of liberal theory, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues 
that democratic states have internalized the rule of law far more than non-democratic states and thus 
comply with international law far more. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World 
of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). Slaughter also argues that democratic states treat each 
other differently than non-democratic states. Because other democracies share their rule of law values 
(in addition to the web of economic and social relationships between democracies), democratic states 
will comply with their legal obligations to one another more than their obligations with regards to non-
democracies. While our study cannot test whether the United States complies more with international 
law and international judicial decisions more often than non-democracies, it can examine whether the 
United States acts differently based on the form of government in a complaining state. Liberal theory 
would expect that the rates of compliance would be higher with regards to democracies than non-
democracies. 
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did not have any statistically significant effect on United States compliance 
levels, indicating that the United States is no more likely to comply with 
international law obligations to other democracies than to non-democracies.145 
More broadly, none of the independent variables accounting for external 
pressures on the state to comply were statistically significant. This suggests as a 
general matter that domestic pressure, rather than international pressure, is 
responsible for understanding the variance in U.S. compliance decisions. This 
does not necessarily mean that external pressure is not a significant cause of 
compliance. Rather, it is possible that the level of external pressure to comply 
may be constant for all cases, and so external pressure is not a good predictor of 
when the United States chooses to comply (or not) for any particular case. The 
level of external pressure may help establish a baseline level of compliance for 
all cases but does not predict movement around the baseline. However, the fact 
that dyad specific factors are not important is still notable. Basic realist 
propositions, such as the idea that the United States is more likely to comply 
when sued by a more economically powerful state, turn out to not be supported. 
Neither are propositions that “interdependence” between country dyads 
(through shared democratic governance structure or formal alliances) should 
lead to greater compliance with treaty obligations borne out. 
Finally, the other case specific variables were also not relevant to the 
compliance decision. The level of political contributions in Model 3 did not 
have a statistically signficant influence on compliance.146  This is notable 
because it indicates that a simple interest group lobbying model is not a very 
good predictor of compliance on trade issues. More importantly for this study, 
controlling for political contributions means that differences between the 
actions of Congress as compared to the actions of the executive branch are not 
driven by interest group action. The differences between U.S. compliance 
decision when congressional action is needed or not persist even when we 
account for political contributions. This result means that it more likely that the 
nature of the two institutions, not interest group politics, makes the Congress 
Required variable important. The study also accounts for cases that challenge 
American domestic trade remedy actions. Trade remedy actions involve 
domestic level decisions to apply safeguards, anti-dumping measures, and 
countervailing duties, and these decisions are frequently challenged at the 
WTO. To make sure that these cases were not driving our results, we included a 
dummy variable to account for any trade remedy specific variation. Some trade 
scholars may be surprised that this variable is not statistically significant, 
indicating that the United States is no more likely to comply in a trade remedy 
cases than in any other issue area.147 
 
 145. In Model 2, the p-value for Polity Score is 0.13. In Model 3, the p-value for Polity Score is 
0.13. 
 146. The p-value is 0.50. 
 147. In Model 2, the p-value for Trade Remedy is 0.24. In Model 3, the p-value for Trade Rem-
edy is 0.19. 
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B. Total Compliance Time 
The second test of our theory was estimating the impact of whether con-
gressional action was required to bring a measure into compliance on the total 
amount of time that compliance took. The total amount of time that compliance 
takes is a measure of the quality of compliance. Because the WTO litigation 
process can be manipulated by dragging out the panel and appeals process 
through requests for compliance panels and other delaying tactics, discussion of 
compliance are not exclusively focused on whether a nation ultimately com-
plied but also on how long compliance takes.148 This test attempts to measure 
the quality of compliance by accounting for the compliance timeline. 
For these tests, once again, the number of observations was the thirty-
seven disputes where the United States did not settle or prevail on the core is-
sue in the case.149 For each of these cases, the dependent variable was calculat-
ed as the number of days from when the conference request was filed until 
when the United States took an action to come into compliance.150 We did so 
using a series of Cox Proportionate Hazard (“Cox PH”) Models.151 Cox PH 
models estimate the influence that a given independent variable has on “surviv-
al.” That is, how long until a time period will end. The reason that we selected 
the Cox PH model, instead of a different durational model, is that it has the ad-
vantage of not requiring assumptions about the distribution of time until an 
event occurs.152 Figure 2 presents the results of these tests. 
Using a similar method to the one we used to present results in the last 
Section,153 Figure 2 presents graphical representations of three Cox PH regres-
sion models. These three models include the same independent variables as 
Figure 1. The difference, however, is that Figure 1 presented the results of logit 
models that can be interpreted as the change in probability that an event will 
occur—in our case, non-compliance with a WTO decision. In contrast, the re-
sults presented in Figure 2 are hazard ratios. Hazard ratios with a value of less 
than 1.0 mean that an event will take longer to occur, whereas hazard ratios 
with a value of greater than 1.0 is likely to occur more quickly. 
In all three of the models included in Figure 2, the Congress Required 
variable is below 1.0 and is statistically significant. The hazard ratio in these 
models for the Congress Required variable ranges from 0.23 in Model 1 to 0.06 
in Model 3. In all three cases, this result is statistically significant at the 0.01 
 
 148. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade 
Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2012); William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119 (2009). 
 149. See supra Table 1. 
 150. For the thirteen cases in which the United States was non-compliant, we used the date 
when the United States came into at least partial compliance. The three cases in which no steps have 
been taken are treated as censored observations as of August 31, 2012. 
 151. For a discussion on the use of durational models generally, see JANET M. BOX-
STEFFENSMEIER & B. S. JONES, EVENT HISTORY MODELING: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (2004); 
and Jim E. Alt, Gary King & Curtis S. Signorino, Aggregation Among Binary, Count, and Duration 
Models: Estimating the Same Quantities From Different Levels of Data, 9 POL. ANAL. 21 (2001). 
 152. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Duration Models and Proportion-
ate Hazards in Political Science, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 972, 974 (2001). 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
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level.154 In other words, these models suggest that we can say with 99% confi-
dence that the disputes that require congressional action to be resolved take 
longer for compliance to occur than other disputes. This result is robust wheth-
er the parsimonious model is used or all of our covariates are included. These 
results support our theory by presenting strong evidence, even controlling for 
competing theories, that the identity of the branch whose action is required to 
provide compliance has a significant impact on how long it takes the United 
States to comply with adverse WTO rulings. 
Figure 2 also presents interesting results with regards to competing hy-
potheses concerning compliance. Again, the retaliatory capacity of the com-
plaining state (or states) does not speed up compliance.155 The polity score of 
the complaining state is not significant indicating that the United States is not 
more likely to comply with adverse WTO judgments faster if the complaining 
state is another democracy.156 More difficult to explain is the formal alliance 
variable. This independent variable is statistically significant but it works in the 
opposite manner than institutional theory would predict.157 The United States 
is likely to take longer to comply with WTO decisions when it has a formal al-
liance with the complaining state than when the complaining state is not a secu-
rity ally. The direction of the variable indicates that having greater interdepend-
ence in formal treaty regimes does not lead to a higher quality of compliance in 
terms of timing. 
C. Robustness Checks 
To help ensure that our results are not the result of either coding decisions 
or model dependence, we performed a number of robustness checks. Each of 
these checks present further evidence to support our theory that a driving factor 
determining the United States’ compliance with WTO decisions is which 
branch of government is required to take action. 
First, one concern is that our coding decisions of the Congress Required 
variable may not have included all of the cases where congressional action was 
required for the United States to remedy the violation alleged in the initial 
complaint. Given that our initial coding of the variable was intentionally con-
servative to create a difficult test for our theory, we coded four alternative ver-
sions of the Congress Required variable to ensure that our results were not 
based solely on our cautious coding decisions. For these alternative variables, 
we added additional cases to our initial list of those requiring congressional ac-
tion. Specifically, we changed the coding of: (1) United States—Helms-
Burton;158 (2) United States—Softwood Lumber III;159 (3) Zeroing cases;160 
 
 154. In Model 1, the p-value for Congress Required is 0.004. In Model 2, the p-value for Con-
gress Required is less than 0.001. In Model 3, the p-value for Congress Required is 0.001. 
 155. In Model 2, the p-value for USA Exports is 0.27. In Model 3, the p-value for USA Exports 
is 0.27. 
 156. In Model 2, the p-value for Polity Score is 0.41. In Model 3, the p-value for Polity Score is 
0.47. 
 157. In Model 2, the p-value for Formal Alliance is 0.02. In Model 3, the p-value for Formal 
Alliance is 0.03. 
 158. This is dispute DS38. United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 
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and (4) all three of the previous cases simultaneously.161 We then re-estimated 
the models presented in Figures 1 and 2 using each of the four alternate ver-
sions of the Congress Required variable. For all of the models and alternative 
variables, the results were substantially the same as those presented in the pa-
per.162 
Second, another concern may be that our results for estimating whether 
the United States would comply with an adverse WTO decision presented in 
Figure 1 were driven by the timing of the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report that we used to code the dependent variable.163 The concern is 
that shortly after the CRS report was released, the United States finally reached 
a deal to resolve a number of zeroing cases. As a result, we created an alternate 
dependent variable that changed the coding for the three zeroing cases listed in 
the CRS report as non-compliant to compliant.164 After doing so, we re-
estimated the models presented in Figure 1. The Congress Required variable 
remained statistically significant at the 0.05 level or higher in all three models. 
Third, it is possible that the models that we used to estimate the total 
compliance time were biased because the models presented in Figure 2 did not 
include cases that had been settled. To address this possibility, we collected da-
ta on the amount of time that elapsed during the litigation and compliance pro-
cess for cases that ultimately settled. The impact for Figure 2 was that there 
were eleven additional cases that we have information on when the settlement 
took place (for the other seven settled cases, it does not appear that the result of 
the negotiations was ever reported to the DSB, and thus we do not know even 
the rough date of when the United States took a compliance action).165 After 
 
WT/DS38 (Consultations Requested on May 3, 1996). 
 159. This is dispute DS236. United States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Cer-
tain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS236 (Consultations Requested on Aug. 21, 2001). 
 160. These are disputes DS294, DS322, DS350, and DS402. United States—Laws, Regulations 
and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), WT/DS294 (Consultations Requested on 
Jun. 12, 2003); United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322 (Consul-
tations Requested on Nov. 24, 2004); United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, WT/DS350 (Consultations Requested on Oct. 2, 2006); and United States—Use of Zero-
ing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea, WT/DS402 (Consultations Requested 
on Nov. 24, 2009). 
 161. These are disputes DS38, DS236, DS294, DS322, DS350, and DS402. US—Helms Burton, 
WT/DS38; US—Softwood Lumber III, WT/DS236; US—Zeroing (EC), WT/DS294; US—Zeroing (Ja-
pan), WT/DS322; US—Continued Zeroing, WT/DS350; and US—Zeroing (Korea), WT/DS402. 
 162. The variable for Congress Required is statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level for 
21 of 24 models estimated for this robustness check. The exception is the models in Figure 1 when the 
Congress Required variable was altered to include only the softwood lumber case (DS236). Of these, 
Model 1 and Model 2 were significant at the 0.1 level, but Model 3 in Figure 1 has a p-value of 0.12. 
 163. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. 
 164. These are disputes DS294, DS322, and DS350. US—Zeroing (EC), WT/DS294; US—
Zeroing (Japan), WT/DS322; and US—Continued Zeroing, WT/DS350. 
 165. The eleven additional cases are: DS6, DS32, DS38, DS39, DS49, DS85, DS88, DS89, 
DS250, DS281, and DS282. United States—Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan 
under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade act of 1974, WT/DS6 (Consultations Requested on May 17, 
1995); United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Women’s and Girls’ Wool Coats, WT/DS32 (Con-
sultations Requested on Mar. 14, 1996); US—Helms Burton, WT/DS38; United States—Tariff Increases 
on Products from the European Communities, WT/DS39 (Consultations Requested on Apr. 18, 1996); 
United States—Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Fresh or Chilled tomatoes from Mexi-
co, WT/DS49 (Consultations Requested on July 1, 1996); United States—Measures Affecting Textiles 
and Apparel Products, WT/DS85 (Consultations Requested on May 22, 1997); United States—Measure 
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including these cases, we re-estimated the models presented in Figure 2 with 48 
instead of 37 observations. In all three models, the Congress Required variable 
remains statistically significant at the 0.01 level or higher. 
Fourth, it would be reasonable to be concerned that our results were at 
least partially driven by our decision on how to code control variables for cases 
brought by multiple complainants.166 For cases with multiple complainants, we 
elected to code the Exports, GDP Per Capita, and Population as the sum of the 
totals for all of the complainants, and the Polity Score as the average for all of 
the complainants. In their paper on compliance with WTO decisions, however, 
Hofmann and Kim took an alternate approach and elected to code control vari-
ables based on the values for the complainant with the largest GDP.167 Alt-
hough we are generally concerned that this approach fails to account for the 
possibility that the stakes may be meaningfully higher when there are multiple 
complainants than if the complainant with the largest GDP had brought the 
complaint alone, we recoded our variables for USA Exports, GDP Per Capita, 
Population, and Polity Score using Hofmann and Kim’s approach. After recod-
ing these variables for cases with multiple complainants, we re-estimated the 
models presented in Figures 1 and 2. After doing so, our results remained sub-
stantively the same.168 
Fifth, a final concern that we attempted to address is the fact that the 
measure of compliance time presented in Figure 2 could be biased because 
measuring from when a conference request was filed until compliance means 
our variable includes both the “litigation time” and the “compliance time.” It 
could be the case that in disputes where Congress is required to act it takes 
longer to litigate, but that after the litigation has completed, the United States 
complies just as promptly as in other cases. To ensure that this possibility was 
not driving our results, we attempted to directly measure “compliance time”: 
for each case we collected the date that the final panel or appellate body report 
for each case was adopted. We then calculated the number of days that elapsed 
from this point until the date when compliance occurred. After doing so, we re-
estimated the models presented in Figure 2 with this new dependent variable. 
The significance and substantive effect of the Congress Required variable was 
comparable to the results presented in Figure 2, and thus did not substantively 
change the results. 
 
Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88 (Consultations Requested on Jun. 20, 1997); United 
States—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Colour Television Receivers from Korea, WT/DS89 (Con-
sultations Requested on Jul. 10, 1997); United States — Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on 
Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WT/DS250 (Consultations Requested on Mar. 20, 2002); 
United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico, WT/DS281 (Consultations Requested 
on Jan. 31, 2003); United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from 
Mexico, WT/DS282 (Consultations Requested on Feb. 18, 2003). 
 166. This includes both consolidated cases and cases where two countries were complainants on 
the same request for consultation. 
 167. See Hofmann & Kim, supra note 50, at 118. 
 168. The models in Figure 1 had a p-value of 0.06, whereas the models in Figure 2 were signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of why and when states comply with international law is 
one of the foundational inquiries in international legal studies. This work at-
tempts to examine compliance actions empirically by studying the compliance 
behavior of the United States in response to adverse WTO dispute resolution 
decisions. Of course, focusing on the U.S. government alone has limitations in 
terms of how well the findings here can generalize to either other substantive 
areas of international law and other states. Our results are unique to this topic, 
and as a consequence we would advocate more research on the supply side of 
compliance. That said, we still believe it is worth considering the implications 
that this study’s results have for understanding states’ compliance with interna-
tional law more broadly. 
First, opening the “black box” of the state is critical to explaining patterns 
of compliance. Different domestic actors can be the source of policy compli-
ance on various issues. This study demonstrates that when the executive branch 
has the power to comply with adverse WTO decisions, then the likelihood of 
compliance is significantly higher and compliance comes significantly faster 
than if congressional action is needed. This result is important because it 
demonstrates that states are not unitary actors when it comes to compliance de-
cisions. The structure of the domestic political system influences the rate of 
compliance across policy issues. 
Our empirical analysis finds that the question of who supplies compliance 
overwhelms the influence of all international factors in predicting compliance, 
including the economic size of the complaining state, and all other domestic 
factors, including political contributions. Which actor within the state has the 
capacity to cure the violation is not only significant in determining the state’s 
compliance, it is also the most important characteristic in explaining compli-
ance. This suggests that it is not useful to talk about a state’s level of compli-
ance when analyzing patterns of compliance. Rather, compliance behavior must 
be disaggregated based on the source of compliance in order to be coherently 
understood. If members of Congress are fundamentally less receptive to ap-
peals that abide by international obligations than members of the executive 
branch (either because of their constituencies, their lack of participation in the 
day-to-day practice of foreign affairs, or super-majority voting rules) then our 
focus should shift to more domestic level variables to understand the effects of 
international law. 
This study also suggests that international relations theories that have ex-
pectations for “state” action may be overly broad. Different actors within a 
state may operate based on different logics. Therefore, the effort to treat the 
state as unitary obscures important causal factors. Our study is generally sup-
portive of the idea that executive branch actors may experience more of a 
“compliance pull” from international law than members of Congress. This 
could be based on the executive branch’s day-to-day operation of foreign af-
fairs, concerns about reciprocity with foreign counterparts, or perception of the 
legitimacy of the dispute resolution process. Members of Congress may have 
lower concerns about reciprocity (particularly on a daily basis), have less expo-
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sure to the dispute settlement processes, and thus, have lower levels of confi-
dence in the legitimacy of the process. Thus the supply-side approach opens up 
a new area of compliance research that has broad implications for theories of 
compliance, in addition to more narrow proposals for designing dispute settle-
ment regimes. 
In broad brushstrokes, this study indicates that institutionalist logic may 
have more force when dealing with executive branch officials. Concerns about 
reputation or a desire to be perceived as a “law-abiding” state may have greater 
influence on government officials who deal with the international system di-
rectly.169 In addition, the managerialist approaches that emphasize the im-
portance of “jaw-boning” or “shaming” may also find a more fertile ground 
when dealing with executive branch officials.170 By contrast, members of Con-
gress may not be influenced by concerns about the perceptions of foreign poli-
cymakers or international officials because they interact with these audiences 
less often. Jaw-boning may be less effective with members of Congress be-
cause they are not at the bargaining table. Furthermore, the same activities that 
might be embarrassing to an executive branch official, such as openly refusing 
to abide by an international court decision, may be the source of pride or great-
er domestic support to a member of Congress. 
When dealing with members of Congress, other models may better de-
scribe compliance behavior. Members of Congress appear less responsive to 
the current levels of prospective remedies available at the WTO than the execu-
tive branch. Nonetheless, legislators may nonetheless be responsive to the ma-
terial consequences of non-compliance that would affect their constituencies. 
Thus, the levels of cooperation that can be sustained when legislative action is 
necessary may depend on the level of retaliation that can be authorized for non-
compliance.171 In dispute settlement design terms, this means that permitting 
higher retaliatory remedies, including retrospective damages or progressively 
higher damages, may be helpful to create the necessary domestic conditions for 
compliance to occur. 
Many WTO disputes end in negotiated settlements. The litigating parties 
agree to an outcome that falls short of full compliance with the WTO adjudica-
tory decision.172 Interestingly, in bargaining for a settlement, the well-known 
intransigence of the U.S. Congress in complying with WTO decisions may be a 
bargaining asset. Two-level bargaining suggests that having a domestic barrier 
to compromise makes a state’s bargaining position more credible.173 Where 
legislative action is needed to cure the violation, the Executive can credibly ar-
 
 169. For a discussion of the role of reputation in furthering compliance with international law, 
see GUZMAN, supra note 48, 7-11; KEOHANE, supra note 141; and Abbott & Snidal, supra note 48, at 
127-131. 
 170. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175 (1993). 
 171. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 153-66; Downs, Rocke & Bar-
soom, supra note 2, at 381. 
 172. See Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational 
Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 285 (2013) (“The DSU underscores that the purpose of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is to resolve disputes, not necessarily to effect compliance with trade rules.”). 
 173. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). 
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gue that United States is unlikely to comply fully or quickly because of the dif-
ficulty of securing the necessary congressional action and, thus, the complain-
ing state should accept a settlement that is less than what the WTO law de-
mands. 
For instance, in the ongoing dispute between the United States and Brazil 
over American subsidies to cotton farmers, the American Executive has been 
able to use legislative intransigence as part of its bargaining strategy. To cure 
the breach of WTO rules, the United States needs to alter the level and type of 
subsidies that it offers to cotton farmers. Agriculture subsidies are generally in-
cluded as part of the U.S. “Farm Bill” that Congress considers every five 
years.174 When bargaining with the Brazilian government, the Executive could 
credibly state that Congress was unlikely to revisit the issue of cotton subsidies 
before the “farm bill” came up for another vote, and in the short term, Brazil 
should accept a compromise solution that allowed American cotton subsidies to 
continue. The Brazilian government would have preferred the elimination of 
U.S. subsidy payments, but was willing to accept the compromise given the 
domestic bargaining constraint the Executive faced.175 
As the United States’s legislative inflexibility on trade issues becomes 
common knowledge, states may expect that compliance will be slow or not 
forthcoming, and may therefore be deterred from bringing complaints. A state’s 
willingness to bring a complaint in the WTO dispute resolution system depends 
on a number of factors, including the political relationship between the states, 
the costs of adjudication, and the expected benefits of a successful suit.176 In a 
suit against the United States, an issue that requires legislative action is likely 
to yield fewer benefits from a successful suit than an issue that requires execu-
tive action to cure. It may also result in higher litigation costs if the United 
States undertakes more appeals in these cases to delay the application of retalia-
tory measures. At the margin, these higher costs and lower benefits may lead 
some states to decide against filing certain WTO claims. 
This increase in bargaining power due to congressional reluctance to 
comply with WTO decisions is not costless. When engaging in trade negotia-
tions, other WTO members may discount the value of American concessions 
because they anticipate that these concessions may be difficult to enforce.177 
Consequently, the United States may lose bargaining power in trade discus-
sions because it is unable to commit Congress to complying with WTO deci-
sions ex post. In WTO or regional trade negotiations, the United States may 
have to offer greater concessions on issues that require congressional involve-
ment than on issues that the executive controls. 
In sum, understanding compliance with international law requires atten-
tion to the demand side and the supply side of policymaking. Much of the work 
of compliance may lie in domestic structures—the statutory system and the 
 
 174. Cf. Chana Joffe-Walt, Why U.S. Taxpayers Started–And Stopped–Paying Brazilian Cotton 
Farmers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: PLANET MONEY (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014 
/01/17/263101422/why-u-s-taxpayers-started-and-stopped-paying-brazilian-cotton-farmers. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Davis & Bermeo, supra note 43. 
 177. See GUZMAN, supra note 48, at 35. 
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level of policy discretion allocated to the Executive—as much as in the design 
of international treaty regimes. Thus far, scholars have focused overwhelming-
ly on the demands for compliance without sufficiently appreciating the role of 
national actors in supplying compliance. This Article demonstrates that the 
supply of compliance is of critical importance to international law and interna-
tional relations theory. Domestic factors are not only relevant, but can be the 
most important element in explaining a state’s actions on the international 
stage.  
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
US Domestic      
Congress 
Required 
0.19 0.40 0 1 
Divided 
Government 
0.73 0.45 0 1 
Relationship     
USA Exports 
(ln) 
10.39 1.95 4.85 13.30 
Formal  
Alliance 
0.70 0.46 0 1 
Complainant     
GDP Per 
Capita (ln) 
9.23 1.31 6.01 12.02 
Population 
(ln) 
18.95 1.99 11.31 21.57 
Polity Score 6.81 5.15 -7 10 
Dispute     
Trade  
Remedy Case  
0.68 0.47 0 1 
Contributions 
(ln) 
18.78 0.64 17.62 19.86 
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APPENDIX B 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
APPENDIX B.1: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FIGURE 1 
 Model 1  
Compliance 
Model 2 
Compliance 
Model 3 
Compliance 
Congress Required 1.93* 
(0.93) 
3.30* 
(1.59) 
3.94* 
(1.95) 
Divided Government  -2.08 
(1.13) 
-2.45 
(1.29) 
Formal Alliance  5.10 
(3.77) 
5.04 
(3.76) 
USA Exports  0.63 
(0.64) 
0.53 
(0.74) 
GDP Per Capita  -0.44 
(0.73) 
-0.34 
(0.74) 
Population  -0.26 
(0.51) 
-0.16 
(0.53) 
Polity Score  -0.37 
(0.25) 
-0.37 
(0.25) 
Trade Remedy Case  1.76 
(1.49) 
2.42 
(1.84) 
Contributions   -0.72 
   (1.07) 
Intercept -1.01* 
(0.41) 
-0.43 
(7.87) 
11.05 
(18.70) 
N 37 37 37 
AIC 47.17 47.73 49.27 
— Standard errors are in parentheses.  
— * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001.  
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APPENDIX B.2: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FIGURE 2 
 Model 1 
Total Time 
Model 2 
Total Time 
Model 3 
Total Time 
Congress Required 0.23** 
(0.50) 
0.06*** 
(0.79) 
0.06** 
(0.86) 
Divided Government  2.89* 
(0.52) 
2.82 
(0.54) 
Formal Alliance  0.23* 
(0.63) 
0.24* 
(0.65) 
USA Exports  0.74 
(0.28) 
0.73 
(0.29) 
GDP Per Capita  1.28 
(0.37) 
1.29 
(0.37) 
Population  1.21 
(0.20) 
1.23 
(0.22) 
Polity Score  1.05 
(0.06) 
1.05 
(0.06) 
Trade Remedy Case  0.32 
(0.67) 
0.34 
(0.75) 
Contributions   0.94 
(0.41) 
    
    
N 37 37 37 
R-Squared 0.26 0.55 0.55 
— Standard errors are in parentheses.  
— * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
For simplicity, we will refer to WTO disputes by their dispute number assigned 
by the WTO. For a complete list of WTO Disputes in chronological order, see 
Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2014). 
  
Sources for U.S. Compliance Time 
 
DS# 
Request 
Date 
Comply 
Date WTO Source U.S. Gov. Source 
DS002, 
DS004 
1/24/95 8/19/97 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 25 
September 1997 
NA 
DS024 12/22/95 3/28/97 DSB Meeting 10 
April 1997 
NA 
DS033 3/14/96 12/4/96 WTO Panel Report 
6 January 1997 
61 Fed. Reg. 
64342 
DS058, 
DS061 
10/8/96 7/8/99 WTO Appellate 
Body Report 22 
October 2001 
64 Fed. Reg. 
36946 
DS099 8/14/97 10/20/00 WTO Panel Report 
7 November 2000 
65 Fed. Reg. 
59391 
DS108 11/18/97 5/11/06 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 17 May 
2006 
Public Law 109-
222 
DS136, 
DS162 
6/4/98 12/3/04 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 17 
December 2004 
Public Law 108-
429 
DS138 6/12/98 3/14/00 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 5 July 
2000 
65 Fed. Reg. 
13713 
DS160 1/26/99 4/12/03 NA H.Rept. 108-77 at 
33.  
DS165 3/4/99 3/3/99 WTO Appellate 
Body Report 11 
December 2000 
March 4, 1999 
Letter Director, 
Trade Compliance 
Division 
DS166 3/17/99 4/9/01 Statement by the 
US and EU 10 
April 2001 
66 Fed. Red. 
18510 
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DS176 7/8/99  NA CRS Report 
RL32014 
DS177, 
DS178 
7/16/99 11/14/01 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 21 
November 2001 
Proclamation 7502 
DS179 7/30/99 8/28/01 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 10 
September 2001 
66 Fed. Reg. 
45278 
DS184 11/18/99 11/8/02 NA 67 Fed. Reg. 
69186  
DS192 4/3/00 11/9/01 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 21 
November 2001 
66 Fed. Reg. 
56805 
DS202 6/13/00 3/1/03 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 19 June 
2006 
68 Fed. Reg. 
19578 
DS212 11/10/00 5/26/06 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 18 March 
2003 
72 Fed. Reg. 6519 
DS213 11/10/00 4/1/04 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 20 April 
2004 
69 Fed. Reg. 
17,131 
DS217, 
DS234 
12/21/00 2/8/06 NA Public Law 109-
171, Sec. 7601 
DS236, 
DS247, 
DS257, 
DS264, 
DS277, 
DS311 
8/21/01 9/12/06 Statement By US 
and Canada 12 
October 2006 
Comprehensive 
Agreement 12 
September 2006 
DS248, 
DS249, 
DS251, 
DS252, 
DS253, 
DS254, 
DS258, 
DS259 
3/7/02 12/4/03 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 10 
December 2003 
Proclamation 7741 
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DS267 9/27/02 4/6/10 Statement by the 
US and Brazil 25 
August 2010 
USTR Press 
Release (April 6, 
2010); Public Law 
112-55 
DS268 10/7/02 6/22/07 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 31 August 
2007 
72 Fed. Reg. 
34442 
DS285 3/13/03  NA CRS Report 
RL32014 
DS294 6/12/03 6/20/12 NA 77 Fed. Reg. 
29875; USTR 
Press Release 
(February 6, 2012) 
DS322 11/24/04 6/20/12 NA 77 Fed. Reg. 
29875; USTR 
Press Release 
(February 6, 2012) 
DS335 11/17/05 8/15/07 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 31 August 
2007 
72 Fed. Reg. 
48257 
DS343, 
DS345 
4/24/06 4/1/09 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 20 April 
2009 
74 Fed. Reg. 
14809 
DS344 5/26/06 6/20/12 NA 77 Fed. Reg. 
29875; USTR 
Press Release 
(February 6, 2012) 
DS350 10/2/06 6/20/12 NA 77 Fed. Reg. 
29875; USTR 
Press Release 
(February 6, 2012) 
DS379 11/19/08  NA CRS Report 
RL32014 
DS382 11/27/08 4/16/12 NA 77 Fed. Reg. 
23659; USITC 
4311 
DS383 11/26/08 7/28/10 DSB Meeting 
Minutes 31 August 
2010 
75 Fed. Reg. 
48940 
DS392 4/17/09 9/30/09 WTO Panel Report 
20 September 
2010 
NA 
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DS402 11/24/09 10/24/11 WTO 
Communique 9 
December 2011 
76 Fed. Reg. 
66892 
DS404 2/1/10 4/16/12 Statement by the 
US 24 May 2012 
77 Fed. Reg. 8101 
 
 
